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ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA S
The dispute between at least six riparian nations over
jurisdictional rights to large tracts of the South China Sea
continues to reign as one of the most likely flashpoints in the
Asia-Pacific theater. The intentions of the chief protagonist in
the conflict, China, will in large measure determine whether this
dilemma will be resolved peacefully or violently. Relying on
three case studies that focus on China's takeover of the Paracel
Islands in 1974, its occupation of six reefs in 1988, and
subsequent reef-hopping incidents in 1992 and 1995, this study
highlights the conditions under which China expanded its presence
in the South China Sea. Based on emerging trends, this thesis
asserts that resource competition will most likely spark future
violence in the South China Sea, and that domestic pressures
within China commit Beijing to a course of hard-shell revanchism.
At the same time, regional sensitivities to Chinese "hegemony" and
the correlation of military forces that weakly favor China suggest
China will strive to avoid or contain a conflict over the near
term. By profiling the character and timing of past Chinese
"aggression" in the South China Sea, this thesis also exposes the
strategems by which Chinese armed forces have pursued national
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Based on emerging regional economic trends, this thesis
asserts that resource competition will be the most important
factor sparking future conflict in the South China Sea.
Faced with prospect of having to feed a burgeoning populace
and fuel its modernization drive, China has a deep and
abiding interest in controlling and exploiting the maritime
treasures of the south. The most likely flashpoint over the
short-term is the sea zone in the extreme southwest corner of
the Spratlys, where Vietnam and China have established
overlapping petroleum exploration concessions. Tensions
between these two antipodes over ownership of large swaths of
the South China Sea persist and it is very conceivable
conflict may follow discovery of commercially viable
quantities of oil or natural gas in that area.
Domestic pressures within China also commit Beijing to a
an uncompromising position on the issue of sovereignty over
disputed islands in the South China Sea. As nationalism
replaces communism as a unifying force in China, it becomes
increasingly more difficult for political leaders in Beijing
to negotiate away territory for peace or profit. China's
senior decisionmakers are willing to assure its neighbors
that the sovereignty issue will be shelved, but in reality
these statements represent more froth than substance.
Chinese leaders cannot permit any section of its former
empire to be sliced away from the "sacred motherland" without
evoking images of past imperial exploitation.
Additionally, the most powerful entity in China, the
PLA, has a significant stake in maintaining control over the
South China Sea, primarily because operations there afford a
budget justifying mission for the navy and air force. The
Spratlys serve as the guiding image for the PLA to acquire
long range aircraft, aerial refueling platforms, airborne
x I
early warning systems, more capable submarines and perhaps
even carriers . As the older generation of revolutionaries
passes and weaker replacements surface to power positions,
the PLA's influence over its political "masters"
correspondingly increases , with obvious implications for
continued expansionism to the south.
In the wake of China's occupation of Mischief Reef in
early 1995, which most ASEAN nations perceived as an act of
aggression, Beijing has been forced to be more circumspect in
its actions in Southeast Asia. Regional sensitivity to
Chinese "hegemony" has heightened. ASEAN 's anxiety has been
manifest in their efforts to upgrade the capabilities of
their respective armed forces
.
In truth, China probably views ASEAN 's present concerns
as only a temporary setback to its long-term plan to gain
control of the islands and reefs of the South China Sea. The
PLA probably will continue to comport itself with the same
conservatism that has marked its previous movements in the
South China Sea. Because the correlation of military forces
weakly favor China, the PLA probably will continue to be
extremely cagey in its probings and occupations to the south.
This dynamic will not be significantly altered in the near
term, especially in light of the growing military strength of
many ASEAN nations.
Given the volatility of this issue and the ramifications
of conflict impinging on freedom of the seas, the United
States maintains a keen interest in facilitating a peaceful
resolution to the South China Sea dilemma. In this endeavor,
the U.S. must be very careful to avoid appearing a puppet
master of ASEAN. As long as China continues to perceive U.S.
actions as attempts to contain a China "standing up," hard-
line conservatives will retain authority in Beijing. With
this danger in mind, the U.S. should consider encouraging
sales of second tier military equipment such as intelligence
XII
systems and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) to Southeast
Asia. Transferring non-lethal hardware is less destabilizing
than high-tech weaponry and may better equip our friends in
the region to thwart China's creeping irredentism.
In the short run the prognosis for regional stability is
good. Based on past patterns China probably will strive to
avoid or contain a conflict. An overaggressive PLA will only
prompt China's neighbors to form deleterious alliances
against Beijing. One ought not overestimate China's
beneficence, however. China is committed to winning rights
of ownership and economic exploitation of the region, and it
is prepared to play the long game or wait for windows of




Territorial disputes centered in the South China Sea rank
among the top three potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific
theater. 1 Competing interests and claims in this region have
created friction analogous to the destructive power of shifting
tectonic plates that line the bottom of the sea floor.
Disagreement between the six contending nations over the scattered
buckshot of islets, reefs and shoals which comprise the Spratly
Islands has not been constrained to diplomatic feuds. Military
conflict has flared in the past and is very likely to occur anon,
with the same destructive and destabilizing consequences for
regional security in Southeast Asia.
By virtue of the aggregate military, economic and political
weight of China, coupled with Beijing's hard-line stance on the
prickly issue of territorial sovereignty, China is a clear
protagonist in the South China Sea drama. China's adamancy in
claiming large tracts of the South China Sea leaves little room
for diplomatic maneuvering or political settlement on the subject.
In an era of economic imperatives, the oil, mineral and fishing
potential of the region has a distinctive allure to all claimants,
especially China, which must come to terms with feeding an ever
growing populace and meeting the petroleum needs of its burgeoning
industries. Acknowledged as a vital national interest, the
Spratly Islands has also become one of the main foci of the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), which has used the issue to justify
increased expenditures on power projection forces. Indeed, the
Spratlys dispute is portrayed as the classic low intensity
conflict China must be prepared to confront in the future.
Beijing now views the Spratlys as a vital and strategic southern
1 U.S. analysts concur the other likely flashpoints are Korea and
Taiwan
maritime frontier, the contest for which stands as a test of
China's ability to reemerge as a great power participant in
regional and world affairs.
As the PLA's military strength waxes in the form of
expanding blue water capabilities, so too reduces the confidence
of ASEAN that peaceful means will be employed to settle the
sovereignty issue. Facing uncertainty, ASEAN nations have begun
to channel their economic success into military power. A classic
security dilemma—whereby arms purchased for defense are construed
as offensive, resulting in a general condition of counter-arming
—
may be at hand, a situation that may spiral into a destabilizing
arms race.
The nations which border the South China Sea are not the only
concerned parties . The United States and Japan have important
economic and security interests at stake, not the least of which
is ensuring freedom of navigation through this high-trafficked
area. Secretary of Defense Perry stated in Beijing in October
1994 that the "peaceful settlement of contending Spratlys claims
is exceedingly important because military action there could upset
regional stability and threaten the sea lines of communication."
Almost eighty percent of Japan's oil needs flow from the Middle
East and Indonesia through the South China Sea. 2 Understanding the
full extent of China's tactics and intentions, and the triggers
which set Chinese gunboats in motion, will be key to constructing
preventative policies that cut any fuses before they are lit.
One of the main themes of this thesis is that China's actions
in the South China Sea demonstrate a motivational pattern,
summarized as a growing desperation by Beijing to control the
potentially rich resources of that region. While strong
assertions of sovereignty form the backdrop to China's claims and
nationalism spurs Beijing to defend its rights there, sensitivity
2 "South China Sea Reference Book," United States Pacific Command,
Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate (Fall 1994), 11.
to resource encroachments and a growing fear of economic
dependency has emerged as the primary determinant of China '
s
willingness to physically assert itself in the South China Sea.
To support this position, the thesis will draw upon a number
of historical cases to discover correlations among different
variables that might prove to be of causal significance for
China's overall strategy in the South China Sea. The case studies
to be examined include China's military action in the Paracels in
1974, and advances in the Spratlys in 1988, 1992, and 1995. This
work will then identify through controlled comparison the
conditions under which China has taken action to project its
influence and control over key territories in the South China Sea.
Another motif of this work revolves around the character of
the PLA's advances. Identifying patterns in the tactics and
timing of PLA operations should serve to sensitize U.S.
decisionmakers and navy planners to the true nature of Chinese
stratagems and warfare intentions. Toward that end, the
techniques by which China physically appropriated territory in the
South China Sea are closely examined. By identifying the set of
circumstances under which China has employed force to advance it
claims, and highlighting the manner in which it has done so, U.S.
actors will be better equipped to understand and perhaps influence
future Chinese behavior before a low-level crisis in the region
escalates to deleterious open warfare. Also, U.S. policymakers
will gain a better appreciation for the type of technology sales
to Southeast Asia that could intensify or temper local tensions.
The difficulty in resolving the South China Sea dilemma has
been compared to disentangling a Gordian knot. According to
prophecy, a knot tied by Gordius, ancient king of Phrygia, was to
be undone only by the person who was to rule Asia. It was
eventually cut, rather than untied, by Alexander the Great. As I
will show, in modern Asia China would prefer to undo the knots
around the South China Sea without engaging in violence, and is





The South China Sea is littered with hundreds of islands,
islets and reefs that, until the last century and a half, were
deemed almost without value. The notion that nations would be
willing to contemplate war over these flecks of land would have
astounded even fishermen of old, who after pulling from the sea
cuttlefish, trepang or black tuna would land on the exposed
outcroppings to dry their catch and nets in the sun. Certainly,
some of the islands in the South China Sea were more valuable than
others, particularly where sea turtles, guano and perhaps sunken
ships could be found. But to pre- 19th century seafarers the low-
lying islets and atolls were orbited by vicious shallows, tidal
drifts, moving sandbars and unpredictable and violent storms.
Chinese travelers from the 12th and 13th centuries saw the South
China Sea's many islands and banks as navigation hazards to be
avoided. Tramping along the coast from port to port was the
preferred avenue of trade for coastal merchants
.
The four main danger zones to ships traversing the South
China Sea (ironically, the same regions coveted today) were Pratas
Island and its adjacent reef, the two archipelagic groups
(Crescent and Amphitrite) that compose the Paracel Islands,
Macclesfield Bank, 3 and the mosaic of 400 islands, reefs, banks,
shoals and cays that make up the Spratlys. 4 (See Figure 1.)
Attempts to establish sovereignty over the formerly
uninhabited archipelagos in the South China Sea is a modern
phenomenon. Today China is the most adamant of claimants, but for
3 Macclesfield Bank is totally submerged.
4 Only 26 features in the Spratlys are above water at high tide and
only seven exceed an area of one half square kilometer.
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Figure 1. Orientation Map of South China Sea (From Ref.
Marwyn Samuels Contest for the South China Sea)
thousands of years the Chinese saw the uninhabited cays and
shoals as places off the map, zones beyond civilization.
Because Chinese emperors viewed sovereignty strictly in terms
of dominance over lesser social organizations, they demanded
loyalty and tribute from distant subjects populating the
continent; they sought rulership over neighboring societies,
places occupied by humans. 5 China expressed no desire to
control or possess barren, peripheral territories until
western encroachments, beginning with the Opium War in 1839,
shocked China into a new awareness of its geographic
vulnerabilities. Likewise, because the islands held marginal
economic value, few other Southeast Asian states made any
effort to secure clear title to them by means of occupation
before this time either. As one contemporary scholar
satired, "Until World War II, the islands in the South China
Sea were only worth their weight in guano." 6
The littoral states perched on the South China Sea were
gradually awakened to the porousness of their borders during
prolonged periods of victimization by foreign powers during
the colonization era. But not until after World War II did
most cultures possess the wherewithal to defend themselves
against foreign incursions. By then, the strategic value of
offshore territory in the South China Sea was transparent.
Prescient Chinese officials had come to view the Paracels as
important to the defense of its southern perimeter as early
5 Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York:
Metheun, 1982), 51.
6 Stewart S. Johnson, "Territorial Issues and Conflict Potential in
the South China Sea," Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall 1994),
29.
as the 1870s. 7 An official Chinese military commission sent
to the archipelago in 1928 assessed, "In the event of war
breaking out suddenly, the [Paracel] islands could be used to
sever the shipping lanes between Singapore and Hong Kong." 8
Moreover, Japan's use of the Paracels and Spratly Islands as
maritime control and jumping off points for invasions of
Indochina and the Philippines during World War II reinforced
the military utility of the islands. 9 The history of
exploitation from the sea crystallized the notion among Asian
regional leaders, especially China and Vietnam, that they
must not be soft on the issue of territorial integrity. A
1958 Peking Review statement best captured China's rigidity,
then and now:
[China] will never allow others to invade or occupy
our territory whatever the pretext. The South
China Sea Islands are China's sacred territory. We
have the duty to defend them and build them up.i°
B. THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL RIVALRY
Given the relative remoteness of the offshore islands
and the ease with which the issue of ownership was
periodically marginalized by claimants faced with competing
and usually more pressing priorities, it is no wonder the
history of occupation and control over the archipelagos,
7 China's ambassador to Britain stated the Paracels belonged to China
in 1876, providing the first evidence of China's intent to annex the
archipelago.
8 Samuels, 59.
9 itu Aba in the Spratlys, for example, became an Imperial Japanese
Navy surveillance post, submarine replenishment station and supply
depot
.
TO Peking Review (September 18, 1958), 21.
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particularly the two most contested areas of the Paracels and
Spratlys, is checkered. Ownership of islets changed hands
incidentally over the last century as various regional and
extraregional actors exerted influence over the maritime
expanse
.
An understanding of the present controversy does not,
however, require excessive historical elaboration. For our
purposes it will suffice to describe the most significant
events in the South China Sea saga following World War II.
Indeed, it is in the postwar period that the regional rivalry
between Asian states over the South China Sea begins to
intensify. The gradual deflation of colonial influence,
coupled with Asia's heightened sensitivity to territorial
integrity, began to create friction on the fringes of newly
minted nation-states, whose leaders aimed to repatriate
"lost" territories and redefine and secure borders based
largely on historical precedence. Jurisdictional rights were
most ambiguous in the maritime regime.
To set the scene, after 1950 the People's Republic of
China maintained its hold over the eastern half of the
Paracels, Taiwanese forces controlled Pratas Island, and
South Vietnam inherited the western half of the Paracels and
several islands in the Spratlys from France in the mid-1950s.
This fragile coexistence was briefly interrupted in 1956,
when a Philippine businessman staked a claim to a host of
unoccupied islands in the Spratlys group. This direct
challenge to the status quo lifted the sluice gates to the
sovereignty issue, and led to a heightened awareness of all
rival claimants to perceived or actual encroachments in their
claimed zones
.
Over the next two decades, China, the Republic of
Vietnam and the Philippines verbally clamored over
territorial rights to the distant sandy shards. The ability
of these states to reinforce their claims by projecting
maritime power was relatively weak, however. Adventurism in
the South China Sea, particularly during the 1950s and 60s,
was also curbed by geopolitical exigencies and various
degrees of domestic instability. In fact, the only party
with a strong physical presence in the contested Spratlys
zone prior to 1970 was Taiwan, which permanently stationed
troops on Itu Aba, the largest island in the Spratlys
archipelago, beginning in 1956.
Surprisingly, Beijing was content to ride on Taipei's
commitment in the region—a tacit understanding existed
between the two entities that ROC forces would uphold greater
China's sovereignty over the entire sprinkling of rock, coral
and sand. Loosely united against potential challengers, the
two China's probably believed their claim was watertight, for
under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, legal jurisdiction
over an archipelago was accorded to the occupant of the
largest island in the grouping. 11 China's argument that it
possessed unquestionable autonomy over the region based on
centuries of exploration and exploitation and historic
"administration" of the islands appeared uncontestable,
especially in light of legal definitions of ownership at the
time.
China's presumed dominion over the South China Sea
islands experienced new shocks in the early 1970s as the
intrinsic strategic and economic value of the islands became
more apparent. Taking advantage of a China distracted by the
throes of the Cultural Revolution, rival claimants started to
methodically absorb fragments of the Spratlys into their
boundaries. Desperate to find viable domestic sources of
petroleum, both Vietnam and the Philippines began to occupy
and bolster defenses on the major islands in the Spratlys
—
1" Alas, among the claimants to territory in the South China Sea only
Malaysia ratified the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.
10
each occupied six by 1973. Vietnam justified its actions and
claims by citing historic use, recognition by third parties,
"administration", and succession to French rights in the
area. 12 The Philippines asserted that rival claims had lapsed
by abandonment 13 and referred to the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951, where Japan renunciated its title to islands
in the South China Sea without naming heritors . Manila
claimed over 50 features in a well-defined geographic polygon
called Kalayaan, 14 and defended its expansion by citing
history, indispensable need and proximity. Within a decade
Malaysia and Brunei also joined the fray: the former
occupied the first of three reefs in the disputed zone in
1983, and the latter claimed a single reef in the mid-1980s
that overlapped its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 15
Talk having turned to take, China came to the conclusion
it would have to apply force to strengthen its hand in a
region where its presupposed influence was rapidly
deteriorating. The possibility that China's strategic
position was on the backslide, and that this negative trend
was being induced by the likes of Vietnam, spurred it into
12 of note, Vietnam explicitly repudiates PRC ownership by calling
the South China Sea the "East Sea."
13 The Philippine argument of res nullius is significantly undercut
by Taiwan's occupation of Itu Aba since 1956.
14 The Philippines, along with Malaysia and Brunei, have clearly
delineated their claims by publishing maps with boundary lines cutting
through or around the Spratlys. To this day, Vietnam and China have not
specified the precise boundaries of their claims to vast areas of the
South China Sea.
15 Malaysia and Brunei's claims are largely a function of the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which gave riparian states a
200NM Exclusion Economic Zone and control over sea and mineral resources
out to 350NM provided a state's continental shelf extended that far from
shore.
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action. Equally compelling, after experiencing a "century of
shame" China could not abide further perceived raping of its
lands. The measures China was able to employ in responding
to these challenges are the subject of the following
chapters
.
C. CHINA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE AND MILITARY STYLE
Any study pertaining to China, particularly where
military matters are concerned, must in the beginning make
clear China's strategic outlook and tactical mindset.
General assertions outlined below attempt to capture the
essential elements of Chinese thought that may throw light on
our understanding of China's strategems in the South China
Sea. The review will serve as a primer for analysis of case
studies that follow.
In the broadest context, China's primary strategic aim
is to establish and maintain order and unity of the nation.
The ability of Chinese leaders to maintain harmony continues
to be the critical test of an "empire's" magnitude, eminence
and durability, and is the ultimate determinant of the
regime's legitimacy. A government charged with ensuring
stability and peace did so by striking a balance, or "golden
mean," between excessive force and undue weakness. A key
element in this philosophy is the idea that the empire must
avoid overextending itself and thereby collapsing into chaos.
The traditional Chinese game called weiqi or "Go" best
illustrates the character of Chinese strategy when
transformed into action. The game is composed of a series of
simple moves for clear objectives. Players take turns
arranging black or white stones on a 19-by-19 square board so
that they enclose the greatest area possible. Despite its
simplicity, the game is one of the most complex in the world.
The most adept players think both offensively and
defensively. The winner in a game usually takes only
12
slightly more territory than his opponent, and any attempt to
completely destroy a skilled adversary or take excessive
risks will ordinarily lead to failure. Additionally, the
four corners of the game board are strategically more
significant than the center. 16
The strategies of Go parallel China's military style.
The ideal military commander is one who possesses an ability
to pursue "security objectives" for a long period of time
without wavering, while constantly reassessing their value
compared to other objectives that emerge. (Whereas Western
strategists generally make calculations based on linear time
separated by decades, Chinese strategists view the world in
time cycles that may span centuries and even millenia.)
Attaining China's strategic goals may entail taking many
small steps over an extended period of time. Put another
way, the Chinese are culturally and psychologically prepared
to administer the "death of a thousand cuts" to achieve their
aims. This focus on minutae means the Chinese also have a
tendency to overemphasize the meaning of small events which
they think may signal a shift in extant power balances or
relationships. On the positive side, China's long view
enables it to select the most opportune moments to move
toward their objectives.
According to Chinese tradition, the ideal military
commander also tries to pursue victory with minimal
destruction—in fact, the apex of skill is to defeat any
opponent without fighting. In the words of Sun Tzu:
Those who are skilled in executing a
strategy bend the strategy of others
without conflict; uproot the
fortifications of others without
16 An introduction to Go: Rules and Strategies for the Ancient
Oriental Game (Tokyo: Ishi Press, 1988); Karl Baker, The Way to Go
(Tokyo: Ishi Press, 1988).
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attacking; absorb the organizations of
others without prolonged operations
.
17
The Chinese eschew large-scale violence where they can
prevail through strategem, surprise, deception or maneuver.
Chinese military strategists prefer indirect methods of war
and are careful to avoid taking immoderate risks . What is
more, the fear of imperial overstretch means Chinese leaders
will be chary about projecting power where an enemy possesses
equal or superior strength. 18 The ideal victory is one
achieved quickly and decisively before an enemy can react,
and before the campaign becomes a drain on the state's
resources
.
The notion that power can develop on the fringes of the
gameboard also highlights China's perennial concern over the
vulnerability of its border areas. In fact, China's focus on
developing power projection forces can be viewed as a
function of its age-old desire to maintain freedom of action
in these peripheral regions . According to one expert on
China's military style "What the Chinese sought to create was
an environment in Asia in which they would be able to
maneuver as they liked from a position of recognized
superiority." 19 This desire to prevent hostile centers of
power from infringing on China's "space" is one of many
factors which help explain Beijing's obdurate stance on
17 sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. R.L. Wing (New York: Doubleday,
1981), 16. Sun Tzu also wrote, "For to win a hundred victories in a
hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill."
18 chen-Ya Tien, Chinese Military Theory (New York: Mosaic Press,
1991).
19 W. Frieman and J. J. Martin, "Chinese Military Style," Technical
Report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington
D.C., April 30, 1991), 28.
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ownership of seemingly meaningless territories in the South
China Sea.
Like the game of Go, the principles of warfare
highlighted above provide a starting point for understanding
China military style. To be sure, they are not a set of
strict rules or formulas to which the modern Chinese army has
always adhered. The Chinese army under Mao violated many
traditional warfare precepts. The Korean War, for example,
was a testament to Beijing's willingness to sends waves of
PLA soldiers across the Yalu to fight and die against
superior odds. While one could also assail the proposition
Beijing possessed long-sightedness in the postwar period, on
balance one can detect traces of China's traditional warfare
style in their military actions over the last four decades.
Attacks against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979, and
support for Vietnam against U.S. forces in the 1960s, for
instance, were all limited in time, scope and space, and were
accompanied by a broader diplomatic campaign. These clashes
were not precipitated by an imminent invasion of China; PLA
operations mainly aimed at reducing constraints on China's
freedom of action. China also forswore ultimate violence to
solve these problems (Beijing declared it would never fire
nuclear weapons first). Moreover, in the face of superior
Soviet forces along its disputed northern border, Beijing
systematically avoided "punishing" its rival. 20 Unwilling to
pit inferior Chinese forces against the might of the Russian
Army, Mao adopted contingency plans to absorb rather than
confront Russian forces. Mao's guerrilla-type strategy of
trading land for time harkens back to ancient conceptions of
withdrawing or waiting when one's army is weaker than an
opponent ' s
.
20 Most Chinese scholars consider the PLA's early 1969 border attacks
against the Soviet Union as irrational acts traceable to the excesses of
the Cultural Revolution.
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This cursory review of China's military style and
strategic culture was intended to give shape and context to
the case studies under examination. With this cultural
backdrop in place, the next several chapters will narrow down
with greater specificity the military and political
conditions under which China resorted to military action to
advance/defend its claims in the South China Sea. It should
become evident as the case studies unfold that China's
approach to "recovering" territory in the South China Sea
reflects a continued awareness of the ancient, and perhaps
immutable, principles of warfare laid out by Chinese
strategists centuries ago. Though China's tradition is
almost exclusively a continental one, Chinese maritime
strategy in the twentieth century has generally cohered to
age-old warfare theories.
16
III. CHINA OUSTS VIETNAM FROM THE PARACELS
This chapter examines the first of three case studies
intended to illuminate the military and political conditions
under which China resorted to the use of force to achieve its
objectives in the South China Sea. The case studies are
formatted similarly. They begin with a short description of
tension-building events leading up to conflict, a review of
the actual fighting, evaluation of the PLA's tactical
performance with regard to its adversary, and lessons the
Chinese may have learned from these encounters . For the sake
of cogency, the chapters devoted to the case studies intermix
military and political developments along a linear timeline.
To ensure historical continuity, the evolution of the PLA's
naval development is laid out, as are significant
transformations of the international political system. The
next three chapters lay the factual groundwork for additional
analysis of economic and domestic variables pivotal to a
comprehensive understanding of China's motives for advancing
southward.
A. CASE STUDY I
1 . Background
The clash in the Paracels in 1974 was ostensibly
precipitated by a bold and all-encompassing claim to the
Spratly Islands by South Vietnam in September 1973. Saigon
consolidated its authority over the Spratlys by incorporating
the Islands into the administrative system of the Republic,
and then sent hundreds of troops to Spratly and Namyit
Island, two of the largest islands in the Spratlys
archipelago. Four months after the formal annexation, China
denounced Vietnam's decree as a "wanton infringement of
17
China's territorial integrity and sovereignty," 21 and formally
reasserted its claim over all the islands and resources of
the South China Sea. In early January 1974 Beijing
threatened Saigon with military action if its forces were not
withdrawn from the Spratlys. From 11-15 January 1974,
Chinese forces underscored its en toto claim by planting
flags on several islands in the western Crescent Group of the
Paracels (see Figure 2), which were lightly defended by
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) troops. In response, Vietnam naval
units were ordered to the Paracels to reinforce RVN holdings
there. Claiming RVN naval units harassed and killed Chinese
fishermen-militia working in the area, China also dispatched
a naval task force to the area. 22
Over the next four days , RVN naval units operating
around the five main islands in the Crescent Group became
increasingly hostile to Chinese vessels in the area.
Vietnamese frigates repeatedly attempted to muscle Chinese
vessels out of the area and even tried to ram one Chinese
fishing boat on 16 January. On January 19, People's
Liberation Army (PLA) troops landed on Duncan Island and
forced a small RVN contingent to withdraw. This skirmish
rapidly escalated into a naval engagement as RVN combatants
became more desperate to repel the Chinese. 23 During the
ensuing fracas an RVN escort ship (probably a corvette) was
sunk and the three Vietnamese frigates were damaged. Chinese
21 Alan J. Day, ed., Border and Territorial Disputes, second edition
(Longman Group UK Ltd, 1987), 376.
22 Samuels, 100-103.
23 An hour after RVN troops were repulsed from Duncan Island, an RVN
frigate reportedly tried to ram a Chinese minesweeper. Two hours later,
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losses included one heavily damaged minesweeper and a
slightly damaged subchaser. 24 The day after the naval
skirmish, PLA Navy (PLAN) units delivered hundreds of PLA
soldiers to the islands. These landings were coordinated
with strikes by Hainan-based MiG fighter-bombers, against
which RVN forces had little defense. The small RVN garrisons
were quickly overcome and soon the PLA secured the entire
archipelago for China. 25
2. PLA Performance
From a tactical perspective, the outcome should have
been predictable. The Paracels operation was authorized by
chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission and the
Premier. The Minister of Defense and Deng Xiaoping
personally supervised the operation. These men had at their
disposal all the resources of the three fleets and naval
aviation wings. The tactical initiative lay with the PLA.
In fact, a close examination of the fighting and manner
of employment of Chinese naval and air units suggests the
Chinese were unprepared for an engagement with the Vietnamese
task force. The Chinese appeared to suffer from a lack of
coordination and an inability to respond to contingencies.
Though command and control was maintained by the Canton
Military Region Headquarters, which reportedly had a trained
battle operations staff, 26 naval infantry units disguised as
fishermen were conducting reconnaissance and participating in
24 Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy Officer's Handbook, Vol.2,
trans. Office of Naval Intelligence (Qingdao: Qingdao Publishing House,
June 1991), 695.
25 Larry J. Eschleman, The Paracels/Spratlys Dispute and Its
Potential for Renewed Sino-Vletnamese Armed Conflict (University of
Hawaii: August 1982), 3.
26 ibid., 53.
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firefights without adequate reinforcements. The only Chinese
naval units in the region were a few small, lightly armed
combatants and auxiliaries (the total displacement tonnage of
the four PLAN units was less than one Vietnamese frigate). 27
Despite the escalatory nature of the conflict in which the
Chinese literally had days to respond to growing Vietnamese
agitation, larger and more capable naval units were not
deployed to the region. The Chinese did not even launch
Chinese attack aircraft to assist the PLAN minesweepers and
subchasers under attack on 19 January, even though the naval
engagement lasted over an hour and a half.
Although the PLAN sent two Chinese fishing boats to the
Crescent Group to act as bait to entice the South Vietnamese
to fire the first shot, the Chinese probably expected the
Vietnamese to fold early and quickly relinquish their tenuous
grip on the islands before a clash would escalate. Indeed,
the apparent lack of coordination on the Chinese side may be
rooted in assumptions made in Beijing that China could coerce
Vietnam to abandon its positions without a major fight. In
fact, available evidence indicates Beijing regarded the
Paracels as a political fight and issued orders to the PLA to
"adhere to struggle by persuasion and never to fire the first
shot." 28 The Chinese probably were surprised by the strong
Vietnamese reaction because they had planned on fighting the
battle mainly on a political front.
Still, the PLA recovered sufficiently from their malaise
to muster enough air and naval strength to sweep through the
Crescent Group the day after the naval clash. Air power and
27 zhan Jun, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower
Mentality and the South China Sea," The Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 1994), 189.
28 Yang Guoyu, The Navy of Contemporary China (Beijing: China Academy
of Social Sciences Press, 1987), 395.
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naval gunfire was used to suppress defenses in landing zones,
utilizing lessons learned from previous amphibious operations
against Hainan and Quemoy in 1949-50, Yikiangshan and the
Tachens in 1954-55 and Quemoy again in 1958. The initial
contingent of subchasers and minesweepers finally was
augmented by as many as five destroyers and frigates. 29
China also decided to exploit its clear advantage in the
air. Airbases on Hainan were not only closer to the
Paracels, but a Chinese radar site capable of providing early
warning was established on Woody Island. Hainan-based
fighter-bombers (possibly MiG-21 FISHBEDs) had enough fuel to
perform multiple target runs before returning to base.
Almost all of Vietnam's F-5 fighters, on the other hand, were
based far afield at Tan Son Nhut airfield near Saigon. None
of Vietnam's air force fighter pilots had seen air-to-air
combat and few had any experience working with the
controllers at the Tactical Air Control Center North, outside
Danang, which would have directed the fighters. The skies
over the Paracels went uncontested, allowing the PLA to land
troops in a virtually hostile-free environment. 30
In the final analysis, the PLA showed that it could
successfully execute a combined arms operation. Though it
was initially unprepared for stiff Vietnamese resistance, it
recovered in time to apply maximum force against an objective
far from the Chinese mainland and achieve a victory for the
"motherland." (See Table 1 for correlation of forces in
January 1974.)
3. Aftermath
After their eviction from the Paracels , the defeated RVN
29 William Story, CAPT, China: Blue Water Navy? (Alexandria:
National Defense University, February 1984).
30 Eschleman, 53.
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forces were ordered to bolster the defenses on Vietnam's six
island possessions in the Spratlys. Convinced that China's
next action would be to bring forces to bear in the Spratlys
archipelago, Vietnam, the Philippines and even Taiwan began
furiously reinforcing their island outposts in the Spratlys
by air and sea convoy. Although they braced for another
invasion, the PLA demurred. PLA forces were more intent on
keeping their prize in the Paracels, and dedicated efforts to
shoring up the defenses of the captured islands to
consolidate the lodgement.
JANUARY 197 4 CHINA VIETNAM
SURFACE FORCE 3 subchasers, 1 minesweeper
(initial clash)
3 Frigates, 1 Corvette
RANGE TO PARACELS 125 miles 200 miles
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT FISHBED F-5s (did not fly)
FLEET AIR COVER YES (though no cover 19 Jan) NO
ISLAND DEFENSES N/A POOR
COMMAND & CONTROL GOOD POOR
SURVEILLANCE CVG EXCELLENT POOR
Table 1. Correlation of Forces January 1974
The PLA's reluctance to press its advantage into the
Spratlys primarily stemmed from a realistic assessment of its
naval and amphibious limitations. The PLAN lacked the
logistic ability to maintain supply lines across 600 miles of
open sea. None of China's fighters could range the Spratlys,
and establishing sea control in unfamiliar waters garnished
with treacherous shoals and patrolled by hostile navies was a
quixotic prospect. (As compelling, Beijing could not be
certain Saigon, Manila and Taipei would not combine forces to
quash the PLA invading force.) And, of course, China had
23
also lost the crucial element of surprise.
Further swaying senior China military commanders from
this course were the bloody lessons of the PLA's assaults on
Dengbu and Quemoy Islands in 1949. Despite crushing
superiority, the PLA was unable to reinforce the initial
invasions and the stranded PLA forces suffered over 10,000
casualties. These disastrous defeats were attributed to sea
and air support failures
.
31 The attack on the Paracels was a
victory for the PLA, but it had also taxed the limits of
China's power projection capabilities.
4. Lessons Learned
China's victory, despite its flaws in execution, was
received with much encomium in Beijing. The victorious PLA
participants became instant heroes and were conferred awards
almost immediately. Such plaudits reflected the significance
of the Paracels affair: first, the PRC had demonstrated its
ability to project power far beyond its mainland shores;
second, the PRC had shown resolve in backing its territorial
claims with armed force. The timing of the operation was
carefully planned to strike while Vietnam was still divided
by civil war. Beijing perceived correctly that Hanoi would
not long remain quiet and neutral on the issue of sovereignty
over the islands (which it had in its capacity as Saigon's
enemy and Beijing's ally). By late 1973, Beijing realized
that Hanoi's tilt toward the USSR meant that Vietnam might
allow Soviet forces access to the Paracels once the nation
was reunited. Beijing was compelled to take preemptive
action to avert the prospect of encirclement by the Soviet
31 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, "China's Strategic Seapower: The
Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age," (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1994), 219.
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Union on China's southern flank. 32
Extraregional factors that may have constrained Chinese
military operations in the South China Sea were absent in
early 1974. Despite continued tension with China due to a
series of border scraps in 1969, the Soviet Union did not
hold a direct stake in the territorial dispute, nor was it
expected to come to the aid of the South Vietnamese. What is
more, the U.S. had withdrawn its military commitments to
Vietnam at the January 1973 accords, and was unwilling to
risk capsizing the raft of goodwill flowing between
Washington and Beijing. Nixon and Kissinger were not about
to derail improving Sino-American relations over a few
obscure islands in the South China Sea. In the final
analysis, Beijing's occupation of the Paracels was achieved
at no political and negligible military cost.
Although the PLAN had placed a strategic feather in
Beijing's cap, more candid senior Chinese officials believed
the Paracels incident had exposed the weaknesses of the PLAN.
They believed the war was "very embarrassing for the Chinese
Navy in that it brought to light all the defects of a large
but weak navy crippled by outmoded strategy and poor
equipment." 33 Critics specifically cited the initial clash
between the PLA task force of light patrol vessels and
minesweepers and RVN combatants . The first Vietnamese
barrage hit four Chinese vessels and nearly sank a Kronstadt
subchaser. During the counterattack Chinese sailors
apparently were forced to use rifles and grenades,
32 For more details on China's concern about Vietnam's drift toward
the USSR see John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea:
The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," The China
Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992), 1001.
33 zhan, 189.
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highlighting the inferiority of PLAN equipment or tactics. 34
Weaknesses were also evident in the relative strengths of the
three fleets: combatants from the East and North Fleets had
to be hurriedly dispatched to the Paracels to provide last-
minute support to the South Sea Fleet units which had already
engaged the Vietnamese. 35 Despite the successful outcome,
tactical lessons from the skirmish spurred China's naval
leadership to place a greater emphasis on contingency
planning, amphibious warfare 36 and balanced fleet
compositions
.
Performance of the Chinese Navy during the Paracels
clash notwithstanding, the very nature of the operation
involving a combined force asserting itself far from the
mainland called into question Mao's fundamental strategy of
using the navy as a "sea guerrilla" force. The "sea
guerrilla" strategy that had dominated Chinese naval
operations and tactics since 1949 revolved around the idea
that naval forces were coastal adjuncts to ground and air
forces and tasked solely to defend the mainland. 37 As an
extension of the "People's War" at sea, this strategy called
for large numbers of torpedo boats and fast patrol craft to
thwart an invasion from sea. Not until its sovereignty was
overtly challenged by Vietnam was China compelled to
34 ibid.
35 ji You, "Facing the New Century: The Chinese Navy and National
Interest," Paper prepared for the conference "Sea Power in the New
Century," Sydney (November 22-23, 1995), 8.
36 The Navy dedicated itself to building more capable amphibious
craft which could operate at long ranges from the mainland. The PLAN
built 24 LSMs and 3 large LSTs by the end of 1981, increasing the PLA's
lift capacity by an estimated seventy percent.
37 Naval subordination is best exemplified by the acronym "PLAN" vice
"PLN."
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reevaluate its longstanding notions of maritime service. The
Paracels incident signalled a new willingness to employ the
PLAN beyond mainland territorial waters to protect China's
"national interests." 38 Indeed, the brief conflict in the
Crescent Group stood as an important milemarker in the slow
transformation of Chinese strategic thinking from deep-seated
"yellow earth" continentalism to a "blue culture" outlook
that recognized the growing importance of seapower.
B. EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S SEAPOWER MENTALITY
1. Crafting the "Offshore Defense" Strategy
The decade following the skirmish in the Paracels saw a
dramatic shift in China's approach to national defense.
Mao's death and the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping signalled a
new era of pragmatism. The road of modernization was a rocky
one for the PLA, however. The PLA's offensive in January
1979 to "punish" Vietnam for invading Cambodia exposed major
deficiencies in PLA equipment and combat capability. Defense
modernization had already been lowered to fourth and last
priority a year earlier. Economic imperatives simply did not
allow the military to eat up China's limited resources—it
was time to choose butter over guns. Defense modernization
was still an important objective, but pledges to promote
national defense came with the understanding that a
strengthened economy preceded and undergirded a defense
build-up.
It was in this reform-oriented environment that a new
maritime strategy was crafted. The bellwether for change was
Admiral Liu Huaqing, who in 1982 promulgated a comprehensive
strategic framework for future naval operations called
38 in larger sense, the Paracels incident also reflected the growing
importance of an authoritarian, or realist, rather than communist, world
view.
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"offshore defense." Echoing Mahan and Gorshkov, Liu stressed
that a nation could not be a major power unless it possessed
seapower. 39 To Liu, the idea of "sea guerrilla" warfare was
outmoded. Since in the foreseeable future no large-scale
invasion of China was likely, the fleet should not be
restricted to the narrow mission of coastal defense. Future
wars would be local ones fought at China's periphery over
maritime interests. And these future battles would require a
navy prepared to fight on short notice and at long ranges
from the mainland. "Offshore defense" nicely dovetailed with
the modernization push and was being voiced at a time when
Chinese overseas trade was just beginning to surge.
Another major impetus for the development of the
"offshore" philosophy was the enlarged Soviet presence in the
region. Cast as an imperialist power colluding with the U.S.
to redivide the world, China had long been wary of Soviet
military activity along its borders. The People's Daily
offered this perspective on the Soviet threat in 1979:
[The USSR] intensifies expansion of its Pacific
fleet in a frenzied attempt to surround us from the
sea.... Facing this kind of serious military
provocation and war clamor, we are like opening the
door to admit robbers and bringing a wolf into our
house if we do not build a powerful navy and
strengthen our coastal defense.
China was unsettled by Soviet naval operations in the Indian
Ocean in the 1970s, and became clearly irate after the
Soviets provided direct support to Vietnam during the 1979
border war. The subsequent Soviet establishment of a forward
deployed base at Cam Ranh Bay for Soviet long-range bombers,
fighters, and naval combatants quickly raised China's
perceptions of vulnerability (as had the prospect of Soviet
39 Liu was intimately familiar with Soviet naval policy as result of
studying in the Soviet Union earlier in his career.
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forces anchored in the Paracels in 1973). In 1983, China
portrayed Vietnam as the "knife the Soviet Union has placed
at the back of China" 40 and accused Moscow of forming a
military alliance with Hanoi as another link in the military
encirclement of China. Beijing's reactions were not
unjustified; by the early 1980s the Soviet Union had
friendship pacts with five countries bordering China
(Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, Mongolia and North Korea).
Stripped of its buffers states, China looked to the sea for
defensive maneuvering room.
The high seas were not simply for the taking, however.
On China's maritime flanks Soviet seapower burgeoned. In the
first half of the 1980s alone the size of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet waxed from 100 to 120 submarines, 72 to 94 principle
combatants, and 370 to 510 naval aircraft. 41 In the South
China Sea, the Soviet Navy began conducting joint exercises
with Vietnam in 1981. Operating from Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet
combatants could rapidly mine Chinese ports or close vital
sea lines of communication in time of war. PRC believed its
merchant lifelines, fishing and offshore oil drilling
operations were directly threatened. Probably of greater
significance, Beijing was concerned that its coastal
provinces, home to the country's most productive industrial
centers and verily the engines of national economic growth,
were inadequately protected. The Chinese rapidly concluded
vast improvements in anti-ship (ASUW) , anti-submarine (ASW)
and anti-air (AAW) capabilities would be required before the
PRC could sweep the Soviets from the China Seas . Liu
40 Brent Smith, Soviet Entrenchment in Cam Ranh Bay: Military and
Political Implications for Japan, ASEAN, and PRC (Naval Postgraduate
School, September 1986), 58.
41 The Military Balance series, International Institute of Strategic
Studies, 1980-1986.
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Huaqing's "offshore" strategy furnished the doctrinal
justification for allocating the necessary resources to meet
this seaward menace.
The "offshore defense" strategy also seemed tailor-made
to China's intention to recapture the Spratlys from Vietnam,
as it had vowed in 1974. The oft-quoted goal of building a
navy that could protect China's maritime interests at
extended ranges implicitly had as its guiding image the pithy
collection of islands and reefs in the Spratlys archipelago.
Geographically, "offshore" was defined as the sea areas
stretching from Korea almost to Singapore, bounded to the
east by Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and the
Philippines. 42 China realized that until it could extend its
military might to every corner of these waters, its maritime
and territorial claims would continue to be low hanging fruit
for its neighbors to pick. In fact, rival claimants to the
Spratlys had already made significant encroachments into the
Spratlys archipelago. The Philippines possessed at least
seven fortified outposts on most of the islands in the
north/northeastern areas of the Spratlys by 1978. With
reunification in 1975, Vietnam, as probably was foreseen by
Beijing, pursued all claims previously enunciated by the
South Vietnamese government. In 1982 Vietnam expanded its
presence in the region beyond its existing possession of six
islands by building garrisons on three additional sand cays.
In response, Malaysia established an outpost on one reef in
the disputed zone and had occupied two more by 1984. To
chants of "offshore defense," China soon took steps to avoid
emerging as the net loser in terms of territory , resources
and "face" in the South China Sea.
42 David Winterford, "Expanding Chinese Naval Power and Maritime
Security in Southeast Asia" (Naval Postgraduate School, January 1992),
16-18. The offshore area is currently defined by the PLA as extending
out to the "first island chain."
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2. The Dragon Extends its Claws
China's 1974 attack in the Paracels represented the
rebirth of Chinese naval and maritime interest in the South
China Sea. Pricked into action to counter perceived Soviet
encirclement and to stop the relentless plundering of its
distant territorial claims, a seagoing fleet was gradually
constructed and the PLAN began stretching its operational
reach. The PLAN'S first out-of-area deployment to the
southwest Pacific took place in 1976; cruises of similar
duration and distance occurred periodically throughout the
late 70s and early 80s.
The real turning point came in 1986 when "offshore
defense" was formally put into practice. In that year, the
Chinese Navy launched its first long-distance joint fleet
exercise in the western Pacific for the purpose of
"intensifying the concept of joint action and improving the
capability of rapid reaction and joint combat." 43 Until 1986,
no combined fleet exercises for the purpose of combat had
occurred. The following year they were made a compulsory
part of the PLAN'S training syllabus. China dispatched its
first joint fleet to the South China Sea in mid 1987. Near
the end of the year a large joint naval contingent sailed to
James Shoal at the southernmost reaches of the South China
Sea. These deployments were clearly meant to display China's
power and determination to control the strategic Spratlys
chain.
43 People ' s Navy News, Beijing, October 6, 1988.
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IV. OLD ENEMIES CLASH AGAIN IN THE SPRATLZS
Tracing the evolution of China's seapower mentality in
the preceding section was intended to serve as background for
the second case. Though many changes had occurred in China
over the span of fourteen years, China had not lost its sense
of territorial vulnerability on its southern flank. (See
Figure 3 for a detailed map of the Spratlys
.
)
A. CASE STUDY II
1 . Background
As the PLAN'S military potential caught up with
Beijing's longstanding maritime goals, China's intolerance to
Vietnamese encroachments in the Spratlys archipelago
stiffened. In April 1987, after Vietnam occupied Barque
Canada Reef, increasing its territorial acquisitions in the
archipelago to over twenty islands and reefs, Beijing
demanded Vietnam's immediate withdrawal and gave notice that
China reserved the right to recover its claimed islands. 44 In
November the decision was made to begin establishing a
Chinese "sea-level weather research station" (i.e., permanent
outpost) on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys. 45 Vietnamese
aircraft reportedly monitored Chinese construction efforts,
while Vietnamese warships shadowed Chinese vessels engaged in
survey and patrol activities. 46 Friction with Vietnamese
44 china may also have been piqued by what it saw as plundering
throughout the archipelago. Malaysia had been building outposts on
Mariveles and Ardasier reefs since 1986. Though China only attacked
Vietnam's actions, the message to other claimants was clear.
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Figure 3. Spratly Islands (From Ref. CIA map 801213)
34
forces correspondingly mounted in the archipelago and it was
only a matter of months before the simmering flashpoint would
flare.
The volatile mix of Chinese and Vietnamese ships in the
same waterspace predictably led to a series of near clashes
between naval units. These brushes usually involved
Vietnamese units approaching the reefs on which Chinese
investigation teams were working. On at least three
occasions, Chinese warships intercepted and turned away the
Vietnamese vessels. The situation climaxed in mid-March 1988
when the PLA sank a Vietnamese auxiliary and damaged an LST
operating in the vicinity of Johnson Reef. 47 The PLA
subsequently consolidated its position in the region,
planting flags and occupying six major reefs by April 1988.
The PLAN had secured a foothold in the contested zone, and




2 . PLA Performance
China's penetration into the archipelago seemed to pose
high risks. Vietnamese forces were well-entrenched on larger
islands, outposted on scores of lesser reefs, and intimately
familiar with the environment (weather phenomena, tidal
changes, location of dangerous shallows, etc). In addition,
the Spratlys are twice as close to Vietnam as China,
47 According to the Chinese account, two Vietnamese Navy freighters
and an amphibious landing ship disembarked over 40 armed men on Johnson
Reef and opened fire on a Chinese shore party conducting a survey of the
area. PLAN ships responded to the attack by firing on the Vietnamese
ships (which were also firing onto the reefs with heavy machine guns).
The Vietnamese may have thought the Chinese were operating too close to
its garrison on Collins Reef (also known as Johnson Reef North).
48 jon Sparks, LCDR, "The Spratly Islands Dispute: Possible Outcomes




optimizing Vietnam's reinforcement posture. Vietnamese long
range transports could provide resupply or reconnaissance of
the islands. Vietnamese fighter-bombers could range parts of
the Spratlys and theoretically interdict China's naval
combatants and B-6 bombers transiting to and/or operating in
the region. 49 Defense in depth was bolstered by Vietnam's
fleet of missile and torpedo patrol boat acquired from USSR.
Further stacking the odds in Vietnam's favor, the Soviets
continued to be a strong ally and presumably could, in a
pinch, be called on to bring its military might stationed in
Cam Ranh Bay to bear against a Chinese task force. 50
In reality, the Vietnamese navy and air force suffered
major deficiencies. The navy was composed of a large number
of Soviet, Chinese and U.S. equipment captured in 1975, but
it heavily relied on Soviet advisors at all levels. Its most
capable combatants were its Soviet-supplied fast attack craft
(including OSA PTGs), but these were slaved to coastal
defense of the mainland. In 1988, Jane's review of the
Vietnamese fleet added, "So far as operational availability
is concerned only a small proportion of [Vietnam's]
considerable force can be reckoned fit for sea due to lack of
maintenance and spares as well as a lengthy period without
sufficient fuel for sea-going training." The Navy's poor
showing, however, was not unexpected given its lack of combat
experience and low-grade operational readiness.
The dependency of Vietnam's air force on Soviet
assistance was even more profound than the navy's, resulting
in similar low readiness rates. Vietnam possessed several
49 a FISHBED would have to a fly subsonic intercept and maintain a
high altitude during most of the mission to save fuel.
50 in the 1987-1988 timeframe, the Soviet Union forward deployed
three to four principal and three to four minor surface combatants , and
two to four subs to Cam Ranh Bay. The supporting composite air wing
consisted of TU-95/-142 BEARs , Tu-16 BADGERS and Mig-23 FLOGGERs
.
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squadrons of FISHBED fighters and FITTER attack aircraft that
could range the western edges of the Spratlys , but these
aircraft were primarily air defense and interdiction weapons
designed to support ground commanders. 51 Vietnamese pilots
did not train to conduct war at sea nor were they comfortable
flying overwater outside GCI range, restricting most
operations to within sight of the coast. Due to training and
flight time per pilot shortfalls, it probably would have been
extremely difficult for Vietnamese fighters to successfully
conduct a maritime strike or intercept Chinese aircraft
flying in the South China Sea. Despite the advantage of
proximity (about 375 miles closer) to the Spratlys, then,
Vietnam's air force could not fully capitalize on its
geographic advantage
.
Vietnam's power projection infirmities were a boon to
the PLAN, which could mount no credible air defense against a
determined opponent. Organic air defenses for surface ships
in the South Sea Fleet consisted of short-range guns and
hand-held missiles. And unlike the Paracels invasion in
1974, none of China's fighters possessed long enough "legs"
to make it to the Spratlys, leaving PLAN ships without air
cover. Conscious of this and other vulnerabilities such as
its thin logistics tail, the PLAN took pains to minimize the
potential for conflict in order to safeguard its tenuous hold
on Fiery Cross, the reef upon which China planned to
establish its forward headquarters in the Spratlys.
Eschewing direct or surprise assaults against existing
Vietnamese claims, Chinese forces ponderously surveyed and
built structures on uninhabited reefs. In fact, the PLA
51 a FITTER is a relatively short range tactical bomber. It would
have to be loaded with light bombs or rockets and two large external
fuel tanks to reach the western fringe of the Spratlys. FITTERS would
enjoy little loiter time to search for naval targets, indicating their
role, if any, would have been limited to bombing enemy-held reefs.
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avoided direct confrontation with Vietnamese forces for ten
months (May 87-March 88) before the clash on Union Atoll.
From a strictly tactical standpoint, shortcomings in
China's amphibious assault capabilities precluded PLA attacks
on Vietnam's island holdings. Less than a fifth of the
amphibious craft stationed in the South Sea Fleet were
capable of the 600 mile transit. 52 Aside from limitations on
lift capacity, PLA marines had minimal training in conducting
opposed landings and little to no combat experience. Unlike
the landings in the Paracels fourteen years earlier, which
met with little resistance, amphibious landings in the
Spratlys would encounter stiff opposition. The Vietnamese-
held islands in the Spratlys were heavily fortified with all
ranges of antiaircraft artillery (12.7mm to 57mm), shoulder-
fired SAMs, tanks and 85mm to 130mm guns; the islands were
simply too small to have undefended sectors. Vietnam also
possessed a large trained naval infantry force
—
perhaps six
times the size of China's—that could be available for
potential counterattacks. 53 Vietnam could also rely on Soviet
reconnaissance and signals intelligence assets to inform them
of Chinese naval operations, giving Vietnam advance warning
of potential threats. 54 Forewarned and geared for action,
Vietnamese forces would probably have inflicted high combat
losses on PLA marines struggling ashore.
Additionally, the PLA's air arm was ill-equipped to
52 only the larger YUKAN class LSTs and YULIANG class LSMs with
deeper keels could weather the voyage. Richard Sharpe, CAPT, ed.,
Jane's Fighting Ships 1987-1988, Jane's International Group, 109-110.
53 china was estimated to have a marine force of 3,000-6,000 troops,
while Vietnam had a total of approximately 30,000 troops, albeit
dispersed along the full stretch of its coast.
54 Rodney Tasker, "Calculating the Risk Factor," Far East Economic
Review (May 5, 1988), 26; "Russian SIGINT Data Aids Vietnam," Jane's
Defence Weekly (May 6, 1995), 3.
38
support an amphibious assault so distant from mainland China.
While PLA Naval Air Force's (PLANAF) 35 B-6 bombers could
easily range the Spratlys and launch air-to-surface missiles,
the missiles were not designed to hit land targets and each
BADGER carried only two. PLANAF B-5 BEAGLE bombers also had
long "legs," but were, like the B-6's, poor close air support
(CAS) platforms. Small, nimble attack aircraft designed for
CAS missions simply could not reach the battlefield. This
fight would not be another Paracels, where China's
overwhelming air superiority forced the Vietnamese defenders
to quickly hoist the white flag.
The PLAN'S single advantage was the superiority of its
fleet to Vietnam's. Not only did it have a qualitative edge
in terms of training and material condition, the PLAN
probably deployed more principal combatants to the region.
References to the types and numbers of ships deployed to the
Spratlys are few, but it appears the Chinese may have had
approximately twenty ships, half of which may have been
combatants. Prior to the mid-March sinkings, Vietnam's naval
contingent consisted primarily of auxiliaries such as
minesweepers, armed freighters and armed fishing vessels.
Although Vietnam's fast and maneuverable PTGs and torpedo
boats would have equalized the threat from PLAN units, there
was no evidence they were deployed to the Spratlys. Either
these units could not safely weather the crossing or Vietnam
decided to hold these units in reserve for more important
engagements (i.e., defending mainland ports and harbors).
Surface firepower clearly favored the PLAN.
The Chinese fleet had a major liability, however, which
prevented it from operating with impunity in the archipelago.
The PLAN'S chief weakness was its lack of surface-to-air
missile defenses, without which fleet units were highly
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vulnerable to Vietnamese aircraft. 55 The Chinese could not
disregard the lethality of Vietnam's FISHBED or FITTER
aircraft armed with either iron bombs or air-to-surface
weapons (AS-7s), which could make seabed ornaments of the PLA
fleet as it massed for an amphibious assault. 56 The Chinese
may also have worried that more capable Soviet tactical
aircraft (such as the FLOGGERs at Cam Ranh Bay) would be
employed if the PLA somehow mishandled the situation. In the
face of these potential show-stopping threats, the PLAN'S
ability to control the seas, much less the air, in support of
amphibious operations was problematic. (See Table 2 for
correlation of forces in March 1988.)
3. The PLA's Artful Employment of Deception
Aware of its vincibility in the southern stretches of
the South China Sea, China viewed an open assault against
Vietnam's islands as tempting disaster. Beijing resolved to
advance its objectives through less risky means, using
deception. Naval missions sent to the Spratlys in mid- to
late 1987 and early 1988 thus were guised as scientific
expeditions. The fleets comprised oceanographic research
vessels and warship escorts, which subsequently deposited
"scientists" and building materials on a total of six reefs.
Portraying its actions as "non-aggressive," China claimed the
U.N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization had
approved the construction of weather research stations on the
55 only one principal combatant in the entire PLAN possessed a SAM
in 1988—a JIANGDONG FF, which had not yet solved problems related to
its missile system.
56 it is unknown whether the PLA understood the true capabilities and
limitations of Vietnamese aircraft in performing maritime strike
missions.
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cays in question. 57 This veneer provided a convenient pretext
for an increased naval presence and helped forestall a direct
confrontation with Vietnamese forces during the early stages
of occupation.
MARCH 1988 CHINA VIETNAM
SURFACE FORCE
Approx 20 Units: scientific
research vessels, auxiliaries
and warships (DDs & FFs)
minesweeper, armed freighters
RANGE TO SPRATLXS 600 miles 225 miles
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT B-6D and B-5 bombers FITTERS or FISHBEDs
AMPHIBIOUS Untested at long range Minimal
NAVAL AIR DEFENSE POOR (handheld SAMs) POOR (handheld SAMs)
ISLAND DEFENSES N/A Multiple caliber guns, AAA
COMMAND & CONTROL POOR POOR
SURVEILLANCE POOR EXCELLENT
Table 2. Correlation of Forces March 1988
B. NULLIFYING SOVIET INTERVENTION
On the surface, it seemed China's cautious approach to
occupation stemmed as much from China's fear of Soviet
intervention as from the PLA'S military insecurities vis-a-
vis Vietnam. Soviet BEAR aircraft routinely patrolled the
South China Sea, conducting flights as far east as the Luzon
Strait and as far south as the Spratlys. The Soviet force
forward deployed to Cam Ranh Bay could, if ordered, track,
identify, attack and attrite a Chinese task force well before
57 Far East Economic Review (August 13, 1992), 15
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it reached the Spratlys. 58
In fact, by 1987 China had little to fear from Soviet
sea and air power. Rapprochement between China and the USSR
removed the Soviets from the military equation and guaranteed
that a fight over the Spratlys would be dealt with on
strictly bilateral grounds . When Gorbachev came to power in
1985 he made improved Sino-Soviet relations the centerpiece
of his Asian policy. Believing the Soviet Union's stagnant
economy could only be remedied by reducing international
hositility and resentment against Soviet expansionism,
Gorbachev prepared to cut down the size of the Soviet army's
"bootprint" in the world. 59 In search of halcyon days,
Gorbachev turned to diplomacy to win over Beijing and calm
China's fears of encirclement. Beijing was receptive because
it saw improved Sino-Soviet relations as another way to
leverage Washington. 60
Sino-Soviet detente actually had its roots in economic
warming in the early 1980s, but it was not until the Soviet
Union addressed three major obstacles (Soviet presence in
Afghanistan, support to Vietnam in Cambodia and massive troop
levels on China's border) that Beijing would consciously
improve political ties. Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostock
speech signalled Moscow preparedness to negotiate these key
issues. 61 Moscow's concessions gradually convinced Beijing
58 Derek da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific (London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1990), 176.
59 David Winterford, "Sino-Soviet Detente: New Challenge to American
Interests in Asia," (Naval Postgraduate School, March 1989).
60 ibid.
61 Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet acceptance of principles for
resolving border disputes, publicly considered removing troops from the
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian border, and announced a small withdrawal
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that the USSR might be prepared to sacrifice the interests of
its Vietnamese ally for better relations with China. 62 By
late 1987, after detente had gained momentum, China was
reasonably certain Moscow would not intervene on Vietnam's
behalf over a few inconsequential reefs in the South China
Sea. In fact, after the March 1988 clash in the Spratlys
Vietnam asked the USSR to send more ships to Cam Ranh Bay as
a gesture of support. Moscow refused on the grounds it would
have an adverse impact on relations with Beijing. 63 Soviet
neutrality over the Spratlys in 1987-88 provided manifest
proof of Moscow's good intentions, and unfettered Beijing to
proceed with its territorial ambitions.
C. TIPTOING AROUND ASEAN
1. China's Sensitivity to Regional Dynamics
China's decision to quietly infiltrate reefs in the
Spratlys was integral to China's strategy to evade Vietnam's
military centers of gravity and avoid alarming ASEAN nations.
Preoccupied with global strategic considerations during the
Cold War, China had long endured Philippine and Malaysian
incursions into the Spratlys because it needed ASEAN 's help
in containing the Soviet threat. China saw the Philippines
and Malaysia as "countries to be won over to its own anti-
hegemonism united front." 64 After Malaysia claimed several
of troops from Afghanistan.
62 winterford, 15.
63 Michael Richardson, "Soviets reverse decision: air and naval
forces will remain," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, Vol. 18, No. 18
(August 1991).
64 Chen Jie, "China's Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the
Philippines and Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10 (October 1994),
894.
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islands in the Spratlys in 1979, for instance, Beijing's
response was very low-key, made through diplomatic channels.
No public references to the Sino-Malaysian dispute were made
until 1983, and even then it was made indirectly, couched in
a general statement of China's claims to the entire area. 65
Cold War exigencies kept Beijing mum over reef hopping
incidents involving Manila or Kuala Lumpur.
Subsiding U.S. -Soviet and Sino-Soviet rivalries in the
early to mid-1980s changed this regional dynamic. A welter
of peripheral issues heretofore frozen by the Cold War were
resuscitated. China's strategic focus consequently shifted
to struggles along its borders that could lead to local wars
.
Beijing's sensitivity to predations in its "back yard" became
more acute, in turn emboldening the PLA to increase its
military profile in the South China Sea.
Still, China was impelled to tread lightly. Despite
ASEAN 's declining strategic importance to China, the regional
bloc remained important to China's economic modernization.
Expanded reform and open-door programs in China led to a
greater dependency on foreign investment and trade with
Southeast Asia. China required a peaceful regional
environment to facilitate economic growth, so it continued to
make tactical decisions within the strictures of its good-
neighbor policy with ASEAN. Beijing was cognizant that,
unlike the Paracels incident—a bilateral dispute, military
splashes in the Spratlys would ripple outward to the capitals
of Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc. China feared
ASEAN perceptions of Chinese expansionism could destabilize
the region and obstruct economic progress.
Two major factors, then, convinced Beijing subterfuge
65 or. Bilveer Singh, "Security Implication of Conflict in the South
China Sea: A Singaporean Perspective," Paper presented at workshop
addressing potential conflict in the South China Sea (Manila,
Philippines, November 12-14, 1995).
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was the most effective means to advance its position in the
Spratlys in 1987. First, China was reluctant to openly
confront Vietnamese forces in the face of uncertain odds. By
claiming the U.N. had approved construction of research
stations, China bought space and time to establish a physical
presence. Second, China's non-confrontational approach
obfuscated Beijing's long term intentions toward territories
claimed and occupied by ASEAN member states. Riding on the
coattails of a legitimate and ongoing international
scientific program, Beijing sought to avoid being
stigmatized by ASEAN as the region's new "hegemon."
2. Fallout from 1988 Sino-Vietnamese Scuffle
In the wake of the clash in March 1988, Chinese
officials assured the Philippines and Malaysia that Beijing
harbored no hostile intentions toward them, and announced
that its dispute with them over the Spratlys could be
resolved through friendly discussions. 66 This "thrust and
reassure" strategy became a familiar profile of China's
operations in the South China Sea. Despite Beijing's
soothing tone, however, China's probings charged the air with
negative ions. Believing the Spratlys incident might
escalate into war, Vietnam promptly increased its naval
presence in the Spratlys to about thirty ships. 67 Malaysian
and Philippine anxieties were manifest in the immediate
dispatch of marine and artillery reinforcements to their
respective garrisons.
Anxious to avoid destabilizing the region, China took
steps to smooth Manila and Kuala Lumpur's feathers. The PLA
limited its activities in the Spratlys to construction on
66 ibid., 901.
67 Murray Hiebert, "No, not another war!" Far East Economic Review
(May 5, 1988), 24.
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uninhabited reefs, while Chinese diplomats pledged their
commitment to peaceful solutions . These measures worked over
time to allay fears of a new Chinese policy of aggressive
irredentism. China's persistent upbraiding of Vietnam
throughout the late 1980s further reassured rival claimants
that China's aggressiveness in the region was aimed squarely
at Vietnam. Afterall, Hanoi was the only claimant that
continued to arrogate territory in the Spratlys . Between
1987 and 1989, Vietnamese forces occupied an additional
fifteen islets and reefs (mainly small outposts on stilts).
ASEAN was not totally unconcerned with China's growing
presence, of course. Some officials probably could not shirk
the feeling a fox had entered the henhouse. But at the time,
Vietnam was being pilloried as the villain apparent of
Southeast Asia. Its continued occupation of Cambodia was
ASEAN' s greatest security problem. 68 The more military
pressure China could exert on Vietnam, the greater likelihood
Hanoi would be persuaded to withdraw from Cambodia. Hence,
bilateral conflict in the Spratlys between China and Vietnam
was not an unwelcome development to ASEAN, and China's naval
presence could be brooked if it came at Vietnam's expense.
Soon, two events would make some ASEAN states shudder at
their tacit support for China's most forward actions in the
South China Sea in 1988. First was China's new post-Cold War
strategy of defending its border interests and winning
regional brushfire wars. Second was China's announcement of
a territorial sea law in 1992, which laid down the glove to
any challengers to China's sovereignty over its sea zones.
68 ASEAN efforts to resolve the Cambodia dilemma was to act as a
crucible uniting Southeast Asian nations together in a common cause.
Based on their Cambodia experience, ASEAN resolved to use diplomacy to
resolve outstanding intra-ASEAN territorial disputes, including the
squabble between Malaysia and the Philippines over jurisdictional rights
in the Spratlys.
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D. CHINA'S POST-COLD WAR STRATEGY
The ebbing of the Cold War in the late 1980s brought new
prominence to regional quarrels. The diminished likelihood
of global conflict convinced Beijing low-intensity conflicts
in the region would become the most likely form of future
military action. Although firmly committed to maintaining a
strong conventional deterrent force against future Russian or
U.S. threats, China's national strategy was retooled to meet
emerging threats from below. Beijing adopted a "Doctrine of
Regional War" and began making adjustments in its force
posture and resource allocations to prepare for limited wars
along its strategic boundary. This new strategy reflected,
in part, U.S. thinking on the nature of modern war, an
analysis of the Gulf War, and a general reflection on "high-
tech" conflicts, which China believes are of a quick-flare,
short-burn caliber. The kind of local wars the PLA foresaw
included conflict with Southeast Asian nations over
territorial disputes and possibly clashes with India, which
appeared to be "muscling in" toward Southeast Asia via the
Andaman Sea and the Straits of Malacca. To respond to these
emerging threats, the PLA planned to develop rapid reaction,
flexible response units equipped with high-tech weapons and
sufficiently mobile to make rapid gains and achieve early
tactical advantage anywhere along China's periphery. 69
Spotlighting regional disputes had clear ramifications
for Southeast Asia. Beijing's focus shifted from threats on
its northern axis to those on its southern flank, and the PLA
began to gear its military capabilities to rapidly project
power against perceived trespassers. A new premium was
placed on controlling the South China Sea and protecting
China's soft underbelly.
69 "New World Order—Enduring Realities—Fundamental Changes," Naval
War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Vol. II, C-2-D-7.
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REEF-HOPPING IN 1992 AND 1995
For the sake of simplicity and because the advances fall
within the same general time span, this chapter lumps several
reef occupations by the PLA under the rubric of a single case
study. This section opens with a description of Beijing's
controversial sea law of 1992 for it provides a key insight
into the degree to which economic imperatives were beginning
to shape China's conceptions of the South China Sea's
importance. The chapter concludes with comparative analysis
of the three case studies from a military and political
perspective
.
A. CHINA'S TERRITORIAL SEA LAW
A law on territorial waters adopted by the Chinese
National People's Congress in February 1992 surprised and
dismayed many regional actors who had hoped China would
cooperate as promised in resolving outstanding territorial
disputes. Instead the law was a hard-line expression of
China's maritime rights. The articles expressed China's
exclusive sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys,
specified China's right to evict foreign naval vessels from
its waters, and authorized the PLAN to pursue foreign ships
violating its regulations to the high seas. The law also
stated all foreign warships must give prior notification and
receive China's permission to pass through China's
territorial seas. Not only did these regulations threaten
freedom of navigation, they revived regional antagonisms over
maritime sovereignty. 70
70 Bilson Kurus, "Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d'Etre,"
Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), 836. ASEAN was worried that
China intended to contravene the Manila Declaration, which had just
ruled out force as a means to resolve the Spratlys dispute.
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ASEAN viewed the territorial sea law as an ominous
development regarding China's position on the South China Sea
disputes. The tenor of the articles suggested China was
tightening the screws on its claims. Why was China suddenly
taking a more aggressive stance? The most logical
explanation turns on China's pressing economic conditions.
China's high growth, rapidly expanding heavy manufacturing
sector, and rapidly growing transportation requirements led
to exploding energy and resource demands in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. By 1992, China was on the verge of becoming
a net importer of oil. Beijing interpreted multiple joint
development schemes sponsored by rival claimants to exploit
offshore petroleum in the South China Sea as direct threats
to China's long term economic sustainability . The law was a
strident warning to its neighbors that they could not exclude
China from development of the area's natural resources. The
hard-line tone of the Chinese law may have also reflected
newfound freedom of action that accrued to Beijing as a
result of the American military departure from the
Philippines in late 1991/early 1992. 71
B. CASE STUDY III
1. The Third Sino-Vietnamese Fracas at Sea
China quickly capitalized on the sea writ. Less than a
month after the Territorial Sea Law proclamation, Chinese
forces landed on Da Ba Dau reef near the Vietnamese-held
island of Sin Cowe East Island. A clash of unknown intensity
took place between Chinese and Vietnamese forces near Union
Atoll on 19 March 1992. Four months later, Chinese marines
landed on Da Lac reef on Tizard Bank. As in 1988, the PLA




China's unwillingness to forcibly oust Vietnam from its
Spratly garrisons reflected continued weaknesses in
amphibious assault and air control that plagued China in
1988. In the span of four years, the PLA had not improved
its capabilities to the degree that it could successfully
conduct an opposed landing against well-defended islands and
then sustain a follow-on presence. The PLA simply could not
mass an effective force beyond territorial waters without
improved command and control, electronic warfare, and
especially air support and air defense.
The PLA had attempted to bridge the distance to the
Spratlys by constructing an airfield in Woody Island in the
Paracels in 1990, but the airfield only closed the gap by 125
miles. China's longest range fighter-bombers like the F-8
FINBACK and A-5 FANTAN could reach the northern cluster of
islands, but they had virtually no loiter time. That the PLA
was still unsatisfied with its air defense posture was
evident in a statement by China's South Sea Fleet Naval Air
Force Commander in the wake of the 1992 clash: "[I]n order
effectively to control and protect the air over the South
China Sea, we must give priority to aircraft capable of long-
distance battle and to carrier-based aircraft." 73
The PLAN had planned to upgrade most of its principal
combatants with radar-guided SAM systems, but only two LUDA
destroyers in the South Sea Fleet were so equipped. The
arming and retrofitting of its fleet with SAM systems had
been delayed for several years because France suspended its
contract to supply naval CROTALE systems to the PLAN after
Tiananmen in 1989. Even if equipped with the missiles, the
72 Tai Ming Cheung, "Fangs of the Dragon," Far East Economic Review
(13 August 1992), 19.
73 Zhan, 200.
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CROTALE's short range (7 NM) was still a distinct liability.
To protect an amphibious assault, ships providing air defense
would have to remain closely tethered to the amphibious
landing force, limiting the navy's ability to maneuver in
response to surface-borne threats
.
74
China was even reluctant to strike Vietnamese-held
islands in 1992 despite the hobbling of the Vietnamese
military following the withdrawal of Russian assistance in
1990. Spare parts shortages, limited fuel availability and
maintenance shortfalls in Vietnam had dramatically cut back
training and operations for all services. Still, Vietnam
continued to be deadly serious about upholding Vietnamese
sovereignty in the Spratlys and other potentially oil-rich
territorial waters in the South China Sea. Sensing Vietnam
would offer heavy resistance, China again avoided striking
directly at Vietnam's nerve centers in the Spratlys. 75 (See
Table 3 for correlation of forces in March 1992.)
In truth, China's liabilities in seizing and holding
islands in the Spratlys may not fully explain its
unwillingness to do so. Since the islands themselves held
marginal strategic value, China may have been content to
simply expand its presence in the archipelago. Why expend
national treasure trying to repel the Vietnamese from islands
when a nearby unihabited reef may actually be closer to a
petroleum source? If we assume China's interest in the South
China Sea was increasingly based on economic factors, it made
better sense for the Chinese to avoid T olence and occupy
reefs they thought sat atop sedimentary structures possibly
containing trapped oil or gas
.
74 Richard Sharpe, CAPT, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1991-1992.
,
Jane's International Group, 112-117.




The minor clash between Chinese and Vietnamese forces in
March 1992 came as no great shock to the region. In fact,
some ASEAN states may have even breathed with relief since
China appeared interested in only enforcing the Territorial
Sea Law vis-a-vis Vietnam. The incident was viewed as just
one more scene in the larger act between the two antipodes.
To outsiders, China and Vietnam were playing out their age-
old antipathies on a fresh battlefield. China's occupation
of an additional two reefs, therefore, received little press
and did not arouse ASEAN ire.
MARCH 19 92 CHINA VIETNAM
SURFACE FORCE Probably 1-2 JIANGHU FF Unknown: probably auxiliaries
AMPHIBIOUS Untested at long range Minimal
FLEET AIR NO FITTER or FISHBED
NAVAL AIR DEFENSE POOR POOR




(Early Warning radar on Fiery
Cross Reef; patrol ships)
GOOD
(Signals collection from Cam
Ranh Bay, aerial recce)
Table 3. Correlation of Forces in March 1992
3. In the Dragon's Jaws at Mischief Reef
Three years later ASEAN was rudely awakened from its
reverie. Most of Southeast Asia was quickly electrified by
news in January 1995 that China had secretly constructed
facilities on Mischief Reef in the Philippine 's EEZ. For the
first time, China physically appropriated territory from a
claimant other than Vietnam. ASEAN 's worst fear—that
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Beijing was engaged in a long term campaign to recapture the
entire area encompassed by its historical claim—had come
true. China's occupation of Mischief was ASEAN 's epiphany, a
revelation of Beijing's real intentions. China's naval
expansion was not, as originally thought, aimed at simply
curbing Vietnam's territorial goals; it was instead a tool to
accomplish Beijing's larger aspirations on the entire
archipelago.
China did not anticipate the outcry and level of
publicity Mischief Reef received. But what motivated China
to even risk such action?
First, the Cold War's passing and the American pullout
from the Philippines made Manila less strategically critical
to China. Beijing may have reasoned that it could endure a
dip in good relations with Manila if it meant gaining a more
advantageous position in the Spratlys. Second, discussions
in 1993-4 with the Philippines over joint development of gas-
rich Reed Bank in the northeast corner of the Spratlys had
been unsuccessful. In mid-1994, Manila leased a block to
Alcorn in Reed Bank for oil studies, giving Beijing the
impression Manila was intent on unilaterally exploiting the
region's natural resources. China probably decided
physically occupying Mischief Reef would place Beijing in a
better position to protect its petroleum rights in the
eastern half of the Spratlys. (As you can see in Figure 4,
Mischief Reef is strategically positioned in the lower middle
section of the Alcorn concession, enhancing the PLA's claim
to potential finds in that area. Mischief is also well-
placed to perform surveillance of any future oil exploration
missions sponsored by rival governments.) Third, China's
occupation of two additional reefs in 1992 to the relative
indifference of ASEAN may have assured Beijing that
unoccupied reefs were easily fleeceable.
54
Southwest Cav /Ni
Figure 4. Northeast Spratlys with Alcorn Study Block (From
Ref . CIA map 737328)
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China calculated correctly that the Philippine military
was too weak to thwart China's advances. Using the cotton-
covered needle approach that worked so well in 1988, China
quietly began building structures on the reef, hoping to be
well entrenched before Philippine authorities could react.
As plausible cover for its acquisition, China concocted a
story about protecting Chinese fishermen from inclement
weather
.
China almost pulled it off. The occupation occurred at
a time when Philippine military power was at a nadir.
President Ramos had channelled moneys slated for defense into
domestic programs designed to bring the nation back onto an
even economic keel. The departure of the U.S. military (and
withdrawal of military assistance funds) had eviscerated
Manila's modernization plans years earlier. 76 The Philippines
most potent air force weapons were five F-5s that could not
dogfight, and the naval fleet was a floating World War II
museum. The Philippines surveillance capabilities were so
poor that the first reports of China's occupation of Mischief
came from Philippine fishermen. 77 A reconnaissance ship sent
to investigate the situation foundered before it came in
range of the reef. China held an unquestionable tactical
advantage in arms. 78 (See Table 4 for the correlation of
forces in February 1995.)
Unable to militarily evict China from Mischief, the
Philippines expressed its outrage through the media. The
76 Kurus, 842.
^^ A Philippine General admitted that the Chinese construction
occurred during the typhoon season when the Philippine Air Force could
not conduct surveillance. Abby Tan, "Chinese Forts Rise From Sand to
Build the Spratlys Tension," Sydney Morning Herald (May 17, 1995).
78 Recto L. Mercene, "Trying A New Tack," Philippines Free Press (11
March, 1995), 10.
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government ferried a group of journalists out to the reef on
a helo-equipped LST. Suddenly, the ripple emanating from
Mischief reached tidal wave size. Chinese expansionism was
laid bare, and it incited fear and suspicion among Southeast
Asian governments, which for years had been willing to
believe China's dulcet promises to resolve sovereignty issues
through friendly discussions. 79 Mischief Reef was tangible
proof of China's hegemonic inclination. Beijing had
miscalculated at significant political cost. 80
FEBRUARY 19 95 CHINA PHILIPPINES
SURFACE FORCE 2+ FFs, amphibs, auxiliaries Amphibs , auxiliaries
AMPHIBIOUS
CAPABILITY
Probably adequate lift for long
range unopposed landings
POOR
FLEET AIR COVER NO NO
NAVAL AIR DEFENSE POOR VERY POOR




Table 4. Correlation of Force February 1995
China may have won at tactical victory at Mischief by
extending and maintaining its gain in the eastern reaches of
the Spratlys system, but the strategic price has been very
costly. No longer can Beijing maneuver in the shadows;
international spotlights mounted on various multilateral
tiers (i.e., ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) discussions and Track
79 Chen, 901.
80 After the Mischief incident, President Ramos even went so far as
to propose an alliance of medium-weight Asia-Pacific powers (Australia,
New Zealand and the ASEAN states) to counterbalance the region's major
powers, notably the PRC. Michael Richardson, "Asian States Ponder
Defense Strategy," International Herald Tribune (August 23, 1995), 1.
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II workshops designed to ensure peaceful resolution to the
dispute) promise to expose any untoward movements by any of
the various claimants. Mischief Reef was a watershed event
not only because it captured regional and world attention,
but also because it permanently affixed to the territorial
polemic a high degree of political visibility.
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
1. Military Windows of Opportunity
After close examination of the three case studies,
several patterns emerged regarding the character and timing
of China's physical advances in the South China Sea. First
among these was the PLA's tactic of only engaging in battles
it could win. In the 1930s, Mao had cautioned, "Fight no
battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of
winning." 81 Where China could not defeat an opponent and
consolidate the victory by dint of its combined arms
capabilities, the effort was not to be undertaken. This
concept of only advancing within one's military arc of
sustainable defense explains, in part, China's dilatory
response to encroachments in the Spratlys throughout the late
1970s and 1980s. 82 In 1974, the proximity of the Paracels to
mainland China and correlation of forces that favored the PLA
over the RVN slid open a military window of opportunity.
Today, the apperture has yet to open wide enought for the PLA
to operate from a position of superiority in the Spratlys.
In late 1993 a senior Chinese officer explained what would
81 Orville Schell, "How to Talk to China," The Nation, Vol. 262, No.
7 (February 19, 1996), 22. Mao's wisdom was far from original. Sun Tzu
had written 2300 years earlier, "He who knows when he can fight and when
he cannot will be victorious."
82 schrader uses the phrase "arc of sustainable defense" on page 19.
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happen even if the PLA were successful in assaulting islands
in the Spratlys
:
After you chased them away, if too many people are
stationed there it will not do. If too many are
stationed there, you will not be able to supply
them. Thus if you leave, they will come again.
Once they come back, you will have to fight again
and if your number is small you will not be able to
win and they will occupy the place again. In this
way, it is not worth it, not worth it. 83
China has not assaulted any Vietnamese-held islands there
because they all fall outside the PLA's "arc." Sensitive to
its own weaknesses in amphibious lift, air support, air
defense, command and control, and sustained long distant
operations, the PLA views any attack on defended islands as
foolhardy and premature. In lieu of an all-out offensive in
the Spratlys, the PLA was consigned to taking unoccupied
reefs. China still occupies no islands in the Spratlys. 84
The manner in which the PLA acquired reefs suggested
China wanted to expand its claims with as little fanfare as
possible. Using deceptive cover (posing as fishermen or
scientists) to mask its actions, China sought to quietly
annex strategically positioned reefs. At the heart of this
policy was China's intent to present regional states with a
fait accompli. Beijing aimed to consolidate its holdings on
the reefs before foreign military forces could intervene.
China's successful capture of the Paracels in 1974 was
83 Senior Colonel Liu Sheng'e, Associate Professor of Nanjing
Political Academy, lecture at Hopkins Nanjing Center, Nanjing, October
1993.
84 Over the last five to ten years, China may have been able to
capture several islands from Vietnam, but it is very unlikely the PLA
could have held these territories without suffering prohibitive losses
in a Vietnamese counterattack. This datapoint is particularly poignant
when one compares Vietnam's fighter-bomber capabilities in the Spratlys
to the PLAN'S relative weaknesses in air defense.
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probably held up as a classic case of outmaneuvering future
opponents (Hanoi and Moscow) before they realized what had
been taken from them.
The PLA also had sound tactical reasons for conducting
low-profile operations. The PLA did not wish to see a crisis
escalate and spill over into another deleterious border war
with Vietnam. That China exhibited self-restraint is best
exemplified by the PLA's controlled and measured responses to
months of harassment in 1988. In fact, a clash may not have
occurred if Vietnam had not brazenly fired on Chinese survey
teams on Johnson Reef. It is interesting to note that after
the 1988 and 1992 clashes, China made no attempt to take
further punitive action against Vietnam's forces. The PLA's
prime directive appeared to be to establish a presence with
minimal noise.
Another military window involves weather. During the
typhoon season between June and November and the wettest
monsoon season between May and September, naval operations
around and activity on the islands and reefs of the South
China Sea is significantly curtailed. A quick glance at the
case studies shows tensions and conflict peak between January
and March, during the season of calm weather. Military
operations around reefs and islands are more likely to be
executed during this timeframe, when the wind and waves die
down to levels conducive to operations around archipelagic
shallows
.
Before the PLA can further pry open a tactical window of
opportunity in the southernmost areas of the South China Sea,
it must acquire and integrate modern Western technology into
its frigates and destroyers, expand its afloat support forces
(i.e., AORs), perfect airborne refueling operations, acquire
long range aircraft and perhaps buy airborne early warning
platforms and/or aircraft carriers. Liu Huaqing's "offshore





2. Political windows of opportunity
Even under ideal military conditions, China's ability to
advance further into the South China Sea is subject to
international political circumstances. In 1974, China
exploited a divided and distracted Vietnam to capture the
Paracels and deny its use by adversaries. In contrast, from
1979 to 1986 Beijing probably felt it could not confront
Vietnam in the Spratlys for fear of pulling Hanoi's patron,
the Soviet Union, into the imbroglio. Throughout the Cold
War, too, China's strategic imperative to maintain the
support of its "friends" in Southeast Asia eliminated any
prospects for the PLA to take action against Malaysian and
Philippine forces before they occupied and fortified islands
and reefs in their respective claimed regions. In reviewing
the occasions on which China did advance its claims by
resorting to physical occupation, Beijing appeared to act
only when a rival claimant was strategically isolated and
economically weak.
China's willingness to assert itself in the South China
Sea is inextricably linked to Beijing's fear its neighbors
will form regional alliances that could limit China's freedom
of action. Beijing took action only after rival states'
extra-regional commitments had been weakened, and their
efforts to build a united front against China fizzled. For
example, China attacked the Paracels after the U.S. pulled
its troops from South Vietnam and Saigon was left to fend for
itself. Advances in the Spratlys in 1988 and 1992 occurred
after Moscow expressed a stronger commitment to Beijing than
did Hanoi. And the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines and
85 sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood, ed., Australia's Maritime Bridge
into Asia (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1995), 117.
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its declining strategic investment probably encouraged China
to occupy Mischief reef in 1995. Reduced commitments from
erstwhile allies opened political windows for China. 86
The minimal amount of trade between China and Vietnam
and China and the Philippines also played into Beijing's
strategy. These nations were not heavy investors or
significant trade partners in mainland China, nor did Beijing
see these Southeast nations as critical markets for its
exports. Encroachments in the South China Sea that came at
the expense of Vietnam and the Philippines would, therefore,
not disrupt China's modernization plans. Anemic economic
claimants are acceptable targets of China's expansionism. 87
The case studies detailed above highlight the military
and international political conditions under which China
resorted to action in the South China Sea. But comparative
military strengths and political feasibility only partially
explain why, when and how China employed force to acquire
territory in the South China Sea. The next chapter focuses
on the degree to which economic factors influenced Beijing's
decisions to advance its claims. Has competition for natural
resources in an era of growing dependency on offshore oil and
fishery-sourced food been the casus belli for conflict in the
South China Sea?
86 u.S. officials publicized the fact that Washington took no
position on the legal merits of competing claims in the Spratlys, and
that the Mutual Defense Treaty with Manila did not cover attacks against
Phillipine-held territories in the archipelago.
87 According to John Leger in "Come Together: Investment and Trade
Links in Asia," China is prioritized fourteenth for Philippine 's foreign
investment. The Philippines is not among China's top fifteen investment
locations. (Far East Economic Review, October 12, 1995)
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VI. CHINA'S GROWING DEPENDENCY ON OFFSHORE RESOURCES
While sovereignty remains a constant variable in all
Chinese moves in the South China Sea, economic calculations
also appear to factor into China's decision to defend its
claims in the region. I intend to show in this chapter that
the level of China's dependency on offshore natural
resources, such as petroleum or fishery-sourced food, is
directly proportional to its willingness to take action where
encroachments in the South China Sea might involve the
plundering of marine resources. Economic considerations
weighed in China's decision to physically advance its claims
in each of the case studies: China invasion of the Paracels
in 1974, and its occupation of nine reefs in the Spratlys in
1988, 1992 and 1995. But based on close examination of the
type of threats perceived by Beijing, economic calculations
factored more decisively in China's advancements in 1992 and
1995. This chapter attempts to determine the importance of
the South China Sea to China's economic needs. It also
addresses how economic threats affect China's willingness to
use forceful means to back its claims
.
The confidential nature of Chinese decisionmaking makes
it difficult to precisely measure the degree to which
economic factors influence the Politburo. However, the
importance Beijing placed on natural resources can be
inferred by studying the manner in which it responded to
economic challenges, and China's overall reliance on offshore
resources to fuel its economy and feed its people.
A. THE SEARCH FOR BLACK GOLD
Offshore petroleum exploration is a relatively recent
phenomenon in Asia. The first seismic surveys in Asian
waters were conducted under U.N. auspices in 1968, revealing
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hydrocarbon potential in the Yellow and East China Seas.
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were quick to capitalize on the
prospect and formed a consortium to develop offshore oil in
those areas in 1970. Though China had begun offshore seismic
surveys in 1969, the sudden interest by foreign nations in
exploiting the seabed resources just off China's northeast
coast spurred Beijing into action. It immediately protested
the consortium's actions and doubled its efforts to conduct
its own surveys and explorations. China began close-to-shore
drilling in the Bohai Gulf in 1971 and purchased a jack-up
rig from Japan in 1973. Still, China lagged behind its
competitors by a significant technological margin throughout
the 1970s.
The dramatic oil price hikes beginning in early 1973
catalyzed Asian nations already in the hunt for oil to expand
oil exploration and production on all fronts. 88 The interest
in developing offshore resources quickly added an economic
dimension to longstanding territorial disputes in the region.
China's awareness of its technological backwardness in
offshore oil production, coupled with the rush by other
regional states to establish joint ventures for oil
exploration in adjacent waters, heightened Beijing's sense of
losing out. The search for black gold was reviving China's
perceptions of territorial vulnerability. Unable to compete,
Beijing feared being victimized as it had during China's
"century of shame." South Vietnam's declaration in July 1973
that it had awarded to a host of foreign oil companies eight
oil exploration tracts in the South China Sea was a worrisome
development in Beijing's eyes. That it followed two months
later by Saigon's annexation of the Spratlys prompted Beijing
to act. In its mid-January 1974 statement issued to South
88 Daniel Dzurek, The South China Sea: A Sea of Troubles (Geographic
Research Study, November 1983).
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Vietnam, the Chinese declared unequivocally that they had
indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and
that "the natural resources in the sea area around them also
belong to China." 89 A week later the PLA ousted the RVN from
the Paracels altogether.
Beijing may have used military force for either of two
reasons : ( 1 ) China undertook preemptive action to deny future
use of the Paracels as a forward military base for Hanoi and
its allies, and/or (2) China felt its offshore natural
resources would be imminently plundered. The interplay of
the two threats probably influenced Beijing's decisionmakers,
but I posit the geopolitical rationale far outweighed the
natural resources argument as a justification for using
military force in 1974.
In the early 1970s offshore oil could not have been a
chief incentive for China to go to war. Although some
Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Brunei were
already pumping high-grade oil from offshore production
sites, the existence of offshore oil in the Paracels was
unproven at that juncture. No detailed seismic surveys, let
alone serious exploration drilling, had been performed off
China's southern coast before 1974. Furthermore, there were
many other more obvious and easily accessible sources of
crude oil in mainland China. In fact, as a result of its
large reserves in Northwest China, Beijing handsomely
profited from the rise in oil prices in 1973. "The Chinese,
if pressed, admit that they have the third largest proven oil
reserves after America and Saudi Arabia in the world," stated
the London Sunday Times in May 1974. China's petroleum
production from onshore sites was so prodigious in that year,
China surpassed Indonesia as South and East Asia's top
89 Kim Sam-0, "Hands Across the Seabed," Far East Economic Review
(February 18, 1974), 39-40.
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petroleum producer. 90 While Beijing recognized the future
potential for offshore exploration and took steps to stay in
the game, it certainly was not willing to risk a major
conflict over phantom hydrocarbon deposits. Hence,
geostrategic considerations probably had an intrinsically




1. Beijing as Competitor for Offshore Petroleum
Within a few years, China's interest in offshore oil
exploration was piqued by a series of successful joint
ventures sponsored by almost all Southeast Asian nations.
Oil was discovered in 1976 at Reed Bank, midway between
Palawan and the Spratlys, and developed by the Philippines
beginning in 1979. Indonesia's offshore oil production,
which began in 1970, accounted for thirty-five percent of
Jakarta's total oil output in 1979. Moreover, Malaysia's
offshore oil production doubled each year throughout the
1970s. Eager to welcome back concessionaires, Hanoi also
oversaw the resumption of drilling in 1976 with a six-well
offshore program. In 1981, after Western oil companies
pulled out due to rigid contract terms and disappointing
finds, Vietnam and the Soviet Union formed a joint venture to
explore and exploit hydrocarbons from Vietnam's southern
continental shelf, striking oil three years later. 92
The significance China attached to these events is best
exemplified by its reactions . After oil was struck in Reed
90 Michael Morrow, "Oil: Catalyst for the Region," Far East Economic
Review (December 27, 1974), 26.
91 Samuels.
92 Mark J. Valencia, South-East Asian Seas: Oil Under Troubled Waters
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 32-38.
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Bank in 1976, China warned the Philippines "encroachments on
Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty are
unpermissable." 93 In April 1979, shortly after Vietnam leased
a concession to Amoco in a disputed area in the Gulf of
Tonkin, China declared four "danger zones" near Hainan and
the Paracels and banned all overflights. Vietnam and the
International Civil Aviation Organization protested because
the declaration necessitated the closing of a major
commercial air corridor, but the "danger zones" stayed in
effect for four months. China also conducted naval and air
exercises in the region. 94 China soon realized the only
viable way it guard against future infringements in its
territorial claim areas would be to plant its own offshore
stakes
.
Southeast Asia's successes in offshore development and a
decline in China's domestic oil production in 1980 figured
prominently in Beijing's decision to seek foreign assistance
in developing its offshore fields. In February 1982, Beijing
established the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) to coordinate contracts with foreign oil companies on
behalf of the State Council. Seven months later, the first
of many cooperative ventures was signed. These joint
ventures concentrated their activities in the Gulf of Tonkin
and off the mainland coast (particularly in the Pearl River
Basin adjacent to Hong Kong). China's leaders were buoyed by
reports that almost a fifth of all estimated Chinese oil
93 b. Wideman, "Manila, Hanoi at odds over isle oil," Honolulu Star-
Bulletin and Advertiser (June 18, 1977), A-14.
94 Mark Valencia in Oil Under Troubled Waters (pg. 100) attributes
China's declaration of "danger zones" to the leasing of oil blocks in
the Gulf of Tonkin, but the dates of closure also overlap China's
invasion of Vietnam in December 1979. The duration of closure probably
related more to China's concerns about Soviet naval operations in the
area.
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potential lay on its continental shelf. 95
Dwindling onshore petroleum production was a major
consideration in China's new emphasis on offshore production,
but exploiting resources on the continental shelf was
attractive for other reasons. Not only were the offshore
fields closer to consumers—industrial and population
centers, but they were less vulnerable than the onshore
fields in northeast and northwest China to potential Soviet
attack. The improved quality of the crude lifted from the
South China Sea seabed (the oil was less waxy and sulphuric)
also reduced the processing burden on China's heavily taxed
oil refineries. Finally, China's contracts with foreign
companies to explore and exploit offshore zones legitimized
and bolstered China's claim to them.
2. Oil Demand Outstrips Domestic Production
In the years preceding China's occupation of reefs in
the Spratlys and clash with the Vietnamese Navy in March
1988, China's booming economy and the demand for refined
petroleum products threatened to outstrip China domestic
production capacity. A growing discrepancy emerged between
China's energy supply and demand after 1984. The situation
was exacerbated by a decline in foreign investment in
offshore oil exploration in 1986. In early January 1988,
economists calculated:
There is no way a three percent year growth in oil
production can feed sustained growth in refined
products demand of six to eight percent per year or
growth in demand for light and middle distillates
of eight to twelve percent per year. 9^
95 Dzurek.
96 "China's Petroleum Exports Face Slide," Oil and Gas Journal
(January 4, 1988), 20.
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Oil experts estimated China could sustain its 1986 oil
production level through at least 2020, but the expanding
consumption requirements of the Chinese economy suggested
China would have to begin importing oil within the decade. 97
A shortage of energy became one of the most important factors
retarding economic growth, and the Chinese turned their
attention increasingly to offshore areas, including the South
China Sea, which they believed offered outstanding geological
conditions for abundant oil and natural gas resources. 98
China's leaders were also eager to find additional
sources of petroleum so that they could convert inefficient
coal-burning industries into modern, high-tech factories.
The nation's dependency on coal is so profound (China relies
on coal for nearly 80 percent of it energy 99 ) that it
currently acts as a brake on China's rapidly developing
economy. Beijing's leaders consider petroleum sine qua non
to Beijing's modernization plans. Without additional
domestic sources of energy, not only will China be prevented
from streamlining its industrial base, Beijing may find
itself in the untenable position of relying on foreign
suppliers for its lifeblood. 10° If the PRC grows as quickly
as many expect in the next twenty to thirty years, China will
experience tremendous resource pressure—a situation
undoubtedly considered by Beijing in the early 1980s.
97 Joseph P. Riva Jr., "Oil distribution and production potential,
Oil and Gas Journal (January 18, 1988), 60.
98 chen, 895.
99 Hisane Masaki, "Can Japan Make Neighbor Clean Up?" Japan Times
Weekly (Tokyo, July 17-23, 1995).
100 china is endeavoring to diversify its energy sources and has
pushed for greater exploitation of natural gas, nuclear and
hydroelectric power as well.
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(Figure 5 charts China's oil import-export trends.)
Against the backdrop of potential energy shortfalls,
China's response to Vietnam's April 1987 occupation of one of
the largest reefs in the Spratlys, Barque Canada, was doubly
vitriolic. China demanded Vietnam's immediate withdrawal
from Barque Canada and nine other islands in the archipelago.
Noting that Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation had
previously identified continental shelf oil exploitation as a
key project, the Chinese asserted that "Vietnam's purpose in
illegally dispatching troops to [Barque Canada] is to occupy
the continental shelf nearby and pave the way for its future
exploitation of oil." 101 China was aware the Spratlys had
very good oil prospects as early as 1982, when the then
president of China's geological society made favorable
predictions about oil exploitation in the region. 102 Although
Beijing did not have the technological know-how in the late
1980s to exploit petroleum in this region, China's leaders
could not sit idly by while an archrival plundered the PRC's
cherished offshore troves. To Beijing, competition for
offshore resources in the South China Sea was a zero-sum
game—Vietnam's gains translated to China's losses. Several
months after Vietnam landed on Barque Canada, the PLAN began
to survey outposts for construction in the archipelago.
While it remains unclear what criteria China used to
select the six reefs it took over by April 1988, they may
have been occupied specifically to undermine rival claims to
prospective resources nearby. The occupied reefs are
dispersed throughout a number of small archipelagos (Laoita
Bank, Tizard Bank, Union Reefs and London Reef). By landing
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Figure 5. China's Oil Imports (Office of Naval Intelligence)
71
China probably intended to supersede, or at least neutralize,
their presumed legal rights to the surrounding seabed and
water column. The only reef apart from other claimants, and
this for defensive purposes, is Fiery Cross, the PLA
"headquarters" in the Spratlys.
The large number of scientists China included in the
investigation teams prior to occupation further suggests
China may have chosen the reefs based on geological
suitability and proximity to sedimentary structures thought
to contain trapped hydrocarbons.
In short, Beijing's economic priorities in the latter
half of the 1980s gave a new sense of urgency to its maritime
claims. Awakened to the limitations of existing petroleum
production, China sought to deter foreign encroachments and
reserve the region for future exploration, when its
extraction capabilities would catch up with its intentions.
3. China's Reaction to Resource Threats in 1992
As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the main
reasons China promulgated the Territorial Sea Law in February
1992 was to warn Southeast Asian nations actively engaged in
offshore production they could not exclude China from
development of the area's natural resources. By 1992, almost
all Southeast Asian nations were heavily involved in oil
exploration off their coasts. A joint venture sponsored by
the Philippines had recently discovered additional sources of
oil off Northwest Palawan Island. Malaysia was producing oil
from ninety wells in 1992, about half the offshore region's
total active wells. Vietnam was emerging as a major regional
oil producer, with its offshore production surpassing China's
by mid-1992. And a month before China passed its sea law,
Vietnam and Malaysia announced their mutual interest in joint
development of the oil reserves in the sea where their claims
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overlapped. 103 Revised geological surveys by the Chinese
Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources led to speculation
that the Spratlys archipelago could contain substantial
hydrocarbon resources (as much as 105 billion barrels of oil
equivalent, an amount greater than China's on-shore
reserves ) . The area surrounding James Shoal was also
estimated to contain upwards of 90 billion barrels of oil. 104
Perceived oceanic transgressions by the riparian states
in Southeast Asia, coupled with China's shifting status from
oil exporter to net importer in the early 1990s, convinced
Beijing it needed to become more proactive in asserting its
rights over a potentially world-class petroleum field in the
Spratlys . China ' s goals were transparent to its neighbors
.
President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan commented in 1993, "The
Chinese Communists want access to the South China Sea, since
the amount of petroleum there could exceed that under the
North Sea." 105 At the very minimum, China was impelled to
construct bulwarks to fend off continued ravagement by
Southeast Asian nations. 106
China's measures included increasing its naval presence
and occupying two additional reefs in the Spratlys in
103 Kurus, 837.
104 Garver, 1015. American geologists speculate the Spratlys
probably contains one to seventeen billion tons of petroleum, mostly
natural gas. See Mark Valencia "China and the South Sea Disputes," 10-
11. Of note, Russia's Research Institute of Geology of Foreign
Countries estimated in 1995 the Spratlys contains roughly six billion
barrels of oil equivalent, seventy percent of which would be natural
gas.
105 Lee Teng-hui, "Asian-Pacific and America," Sino-American
Relations (Taipei), Vol.19, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), 12.
106 "Territorial Disputes Simmer in Areas of the South China Sea,"
Oil and Gas Journal (July 13, 1992), 20-21.
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February and July of 1992. Though no direct economic
benefits accrued from occupying these reefs, it is revealing
to note Da Ba Dau reef was the easternmost reef yet occupied
by the PLA in the Spratlys. The reef was so diminutive and
close (just east) to Vietnam's Sin Cowe East Island, its
occupation suggested China was trying to trump Vietnam's
claims to resources in the eastern part of the archipelago.




The near simultaneous events of China's declaration of
the Territorial Sea Law, the occupation of two reefs in the
Spratlys and the minor skirmish with Vietnamese naval units
reflected China's heightened sensitivity to resource
invasions in the South China Sea. Beijing realized it had to
assert itself more forcibly if it were to gain a stronger
voice in determining how or if resources would be divided in
offshore areas. At stake was China's modernization program
and the finite fuel resources at its disposal to maintain
industrial momentum. Beijing's proclamation on ownership and
physical advances in the Spratlys in 1992 were spokes in a
wheel: at the hub lay China's unbending approach toward
territorial sovereignty; traction was provided by the PLAN'S
growing power projection capabilities; and the revolutions
were being driven by China's economic engine.
4. Claims Asserted Via Joint Development Scheme
China's new emphasis on controlling petroleum
107 The two reefs occupied by the PLA in 1992—Da Ba Dau and Da Lac
in Tizard Bank—may have only been temporary acquisitions. Contemporary
sources credit China with only seven other reefs. China may have
realized that under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, manmade
structures on reefs do not qualify as islands and cannot have their own
Economic Exclusion Zone. In other words, occupation was not tantamount
to ownership of adjacent seabed resources. For this reason, the PLA may
have not bothered maintaining outposts on the two diminutive reefs.
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exploration in distant waters was manifest in an
unprecedented cooperation contract between CNOOC and Crestone
Energy Corporation in May 1992. The contract called for
joint exploration in a 25,000 square km block in the
southwest perimeter of the Spratlys archipelago, just inside
the China's sweeping historic claim line (see Figure 6). The
contract was significant not only for its sheer technological
ambitiousnes s, 108 but because it violated a standing agreement
among the six claimants to the Spratlys to defer development
in the area until their disputes had been resolved.
Consistent with past tactics of furnishing legitimate cover
for its actions, China used Crestone to reaffirm and
internationalize its title.
China justified its actions by pointing to Vietnamese
exploration activity directly west of the Crestone block.
Hanoi insisted the Crestone concession was illegal because it
fell on Vietnam's continental shelf, but confined its
protests to Beijing. Vietnam avoided chastising the U.S. oil
company because Hanoi thought it might ruin its chances of
having the U.S. trade embargo lifted. Vietnam's timidity




5. China's Economic Motivations Explain Mischief
That China was conducting a more assertive policy aimed
at satisfying its twin concerns of sovereignty and energy
helps explain Beijing's actions in the Southwest Spratlys
where oil prospects were roseate. But why did Beijing decide
1 08 The water was so deep in most of the contract block that
exploration would present major technological challenges, even to the
most well-equipped and experienced wildcatters.
109 Michael Richardson, "Strategic Signpost for Asia," Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter (January, 1995), 50.
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to occupy Mischief Reef in the Philippines claim zone, where
prospects were relatively meager? Beijing seemed to be
throwing a lot of political capital to the wind by
penetrating so deeply into the Philippine EEZ in 1995.
The best explanation returns to China's perceptions of
economic threats and China's desire to preempt exploration by
foreign companies that would leave China the net loser in
terms of territory and resources. China's occupation of
Mischief Reef was not a bolt from the blue. It was preceded
by a logical chain of events beginning with a fallout with
the Philippines over exploration in the northeast region of
the Spratlys.
After joint development talks between China and the
Philippines over gas-rich Reed Bank broke down in early 1994,
Manila decided in May to grant a six-month oil exploration
permit to an American oil company. The Philippines was
interested in collecting additional seismic data on the
seabed southwest of Reed Bank. Manila hoped the contract
would remain a secret, but news of the collaboration soon
leaked. Beijing swiftly issued a statement reaffirming
China's sovereignty over the area covered by the license, and
ignored Manila's belated invitation to become a partner in
the project. Manila back-pedaled on the diplomatic front for
weeks, but the damage had been done. By secretly licensing a
solo exploration effort without consulting the Chinese, the
Philippines had appeared to be engaging in unilateral efforts
to exploit the natural resources of the Spratlys. 110
Manila's untrustworthiness proved, China decided to
advance eastward to a perch that allowed China better
surveillance coverage of possible Philippine-sponsored oil
110 China probably was further aggravated by an additional resource
encroachments to the south, where in November 1994 Exxon signed a $35
billion deal with Indonesia to develop gas fields north of Natuna Island
(within China's historic claim zone).
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Figure 6. Claims, Oilfields and Concessions (From Ref. Mark
Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes," Oct 1995)
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exploration activity. 111 China was forced to show it was not
sleeping on its rights. Occupying Mischief Reef also
strengthened China's hand were petroleum ever to be
discovered in the area. Though the Chinese post on Mischief
Reef were not discovered until February 1995, the advanced
stage of the buildings indicated construction had begun in
the fall of 1994, just a few months after Manila's faux pas.
China quietly advanced eastward because it believed it was
acting in defense of urgent economic and territorial
imperatives, and it was anxious to stop the plundering along
its periphery. 112
B. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF FISHERI-SOURCED FOOD
Rich hydrocarbon deposits and China's hungry economy
lured Beijing to the sea, but other ocean resources are
gradually becoming more important to China's national health
as well. Fishery-sourced food, for example, has emerged as a
provisional source of nutrition that could partly compensate
for relative declines in agricultural output. As China's
population distends, China will become increasingly dependent
on the fishing industry to feed its people.
Until recently, agricultural production had been able to
satisfy the basic human nutritional needs of the whole
nation. Large-scale capital construction on farmland and
investment projects to modernize agricultural equipment were
undertaken in the late 1970s and led to hefty crop yields
throughout the 1980s. The introduction of advanced
agricultural technologies also increased the output value of
many products. In fact, the output of some major Chinese
' 1
1 Examination of available charts shows Mischief Reef in the
southwest corner of the block licensed for survey by Manila in May 1994
112 Rigoberto Tiglao, "Troubled Waters," Far East Economic Review
(June 30, 1994), 20.
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agricultural products ranked first in the world in 1990. 113
The limiting factor to China's agricultural productivity
is the area of cultivable land. The amount of arable land in
China is very small, approximately ten percent of China's
land mass. 114 In addition, about half of the cultivable land
area is of low quality due to conditions such as soil
salinity-alkalinity, falling water tables, erosion and
desertification. Floods, sandstorms and drought are
persistent problems. The total amount of arable land is also
on the decline. Significant drops occurred between 1970 and
1987 as farmland was converted to serve industrial,
transportation and urban construction purposes. Increasing
the efficiency of agricultural production through greater
mechanization is complicated by lack of funds for investment
and the problem of how to deploy displaced rural labor. 115
China not only faces declining amounts of cultivable
land, but its population continues to grow steadily. By the
year 2020, China is predicted to have 250 million more mouths
to feed. Even with population control measures and enhanced
agricultural techniques, China will become increasingly
dependent on alternative sources of food. China is already
experiencing problems. Until two years ago China was a net
grain exporter. In December 1995, China signed a major long
term agreement with Australia to purchase millions of tons of
wheat over the next several years. China has arranged
113 The National Economic Atlas of China (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
114 Deserts (33 percent), grasslands (20 percent) and forest (almost
13 percent) make up much of the remaining land.
115 Karsten Grummitt, China Economic Handbook (London: Euromonitor
Publications Limited, 1986), 50.
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similar large purchases from Canada. 116 In February 1996,
China became the largest single buyer of U.S. wheat and
sought assurances of a steady supply in the future. 117 One
resource-expert Cassandra wrote in 1994 that given China's
pace of economic growth, it would eventually have to import
so much grain that the total international grain supply would
be insufficient by 2020. 118
Today, aquatic products represent less than fifteen
percent of per capita output of major agricultural products
,
but the relative value of fishing has been appreciating. As
early as 1984, Lui Huaqing noted China had a large and
growing population, whose diet would increasingly require the
protein supplied by fish. Chinese journals in 1989 similarly
argued that eighty percent of the earth's living resources
were in the sea, and fish would become an increasingly
important source of animal protein. 119 Seafood is also an
important source of iodine. Subsistence farming on iodine-
deficient soils of inland China has already resulted in an
inordinately large number of cretins in China's population.
World Health Organization statistics indicate that of the
estimate 1.6 billion cases of iodine deficiency worldwide,
almost a third (500 million) live in China. 120 Expanding
116 "China's Political Stability and the Food Factor," Asian Defence
Journal (March 1996), 86.
117 "Trade Realities," Asiaweek, Vol. 22, No. 8 (February 23, 1996),
5.
118 b.M. Bhatia, "Will China Eat Up the World?" Hindustan Times (New
Delhi, June 16, 1995).
119 Garver, 1019, 1022.
120 Patrick E. Tyler, "Lacking Iodine in Their Diets, Millions in
China Are Retarded," The New York Times, Vol. 145, No. 50,448 (June 4,
1996).
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China's fishing industry has an obvious nutritional benefit,
is compatible with China ' s need for low-technology human-
intensive occupations, and is a preferred alternative to
imports
.
As more Chinese fishermen head out to sea, a great
percentage will steer south. Of all China's adjacent seas,
the South China Sea has the greatest variety of marine fish
in China, and bountiful fishing grounds (especially for
mackeral) exist in the vicinity of Hainan Islands and the
Paracels (see Figure 7). The Spratlys area straddles the
migration path of commercially viable fish stock such as
yellowfin tuna. 121 The coralline nature of the reefs and
atolls in the area contribute to the diversity and
productivity of marine life and serve as breeding grounds for
a wide range of fish species. In 1993, the fishing catch
west of Palawan Island reportedly topped 160,000 metric tons
(put in perspective, Philippine fishermen haul one fifth of
the total domestic catch from this region—by far the highest
yield area for that nation
.
)
122 The South China Sea may not
only be the locus for fueling China's future economy, but may
become increasingly important in filling China's "iron rice
bowls" as well. A Chinese article published in 1988 best
captures China's thinking on the matter:
In order to make sure that the descendents of the
Chinese nation can survive, develop, prosper and
flourish in the world in the future, we should
vigorously develop and use the oceans. To protect
and defend the rights and interests of the reefs
121 According to a Chinese article the Spratlys "are a world of fish.
China's largest tropical sea market, which covers an area of around
76,000 square km, is located here." "I Love You, Nansha," Beijing, FBIS,
July 3, 1995.
122 1993 Fisheries Profile. Prepared by the Fisheries Policy
Research and Economics Division, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, October 1994.
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and islands within Chinese waters is a sacred
mission. .. .The [Spratly] Islands not only occupy an
important strategic position, but every reef and
island is connected to a large area of territorial
water and an exclusive economic zone that is
priceless. . . . 123
C. THE TRANSFORMING NATURE OF THE "THREAT"
China's advances in the South China Sea have had a
single purpose to repel threats to Beijing's autonomy, but
the nature of the threat has transformed over time. Military
and political openings gave China maneuvering room to respond
to sovereignty threats and contain Vietnam and potential
Soviet "expansionism" in 1974. By 1988, economic factors had
begun to play into China's conception of sovereignty. In
1992 and 1995 China's reactions appeared to be triggered
primarily by economic considerations. The islands in the
South China Sea were not valued in themselves, but as hooks
upon which to hang much larger claims to zones of marine
jurisdiction. China thinks control of offshore resources
surrounding the Spratlys, particularly petroleum, 124 may be
pivotal to its economic survival. The perception that
foreign economic encroachments might deny China these
resources (and perhaps contribute to the asphixiation of the
"motherland") spurred China into action. In retrospect,
China's occupation of reefs in 1992 and 1995 can be viewed as
defensive reactions to what Beijing believed were attempts by
neighboring nations to bleed China of marine resources vital
to its future sustenance. While the golden thread of
sovereignty is interlaced with China's every move in the
123 Garver, 1019.
124 onshore resource prospects were dim in 1992 and 1995. China's
largest crude producing field, Daqing, is still being depleted and faces
increasing difficulty in producing at previous levels. The same problem
is occurring in other eastern fields. Oil & Gas Journal (September 25,
1995).
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Figure 7. China's Offshore Fishing Grounds (From Ref. The
National Economic Atlas of China, 1994)
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South China Sea, the resource issue appears to have injected
a new sense of urgency to China's general claims to the
region
.
This chapter showed that economic imperatives have
emerged as a crucial variable in explaining the timing and
rationale for China's expanded presence in the South China
Sea. Competition for seabed and water column resources has
clearly acted as a stimulus for Chinese advances southward.
In fact, Beijing's propensity to take action in the South
China Sea in future conflict scenarios will be influenced by
its marked dependency on offshore resources.
The following chapter investigates further the degree to
which domestic factors curb or encourage Beijing to take
action in disputed zones . What other factors prevent China
from sacrificing a smidgen of sovereignty for peace,
stability and a fair share of the natural resources in the
South China Sea?
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VII. DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON CHINA'S SOUTH CHINA SEA
POLICY
This study of China's advances into the South China Sea
so far has stressed geopolitical and economic factors as
chief variables which explain the PLA's southward expansion.
While previous analysis has perforce touched upon particular
domestic conditions that support the above rationales,
calculations of China's motives in this region would be
incomplete without a more detailed look at matters through a
broader domestic lens. After all, "domestic determinants
almost always explain most of a nation's foreign policy
variance." 125 This section examines general trends within
Chinese government and society that impact China's
territorial resolve: specifically, the implications of
Chinese nationalism, bureaucratic interests of the PLAN, the
relative influence of the PLA in domestic politics and the
distractive phenomena of "rebels" and radical reformers.
A. NATIONALISM & THE IMPERATIVE OF UNITY
Most Chinese hew to the theory that life is cyclical
rather than linear, and view China's resurgence as a great
power as a natural consequence of dynastic evolutions that
can be traced back four millennia. China's "century of
shame" which lasted from the Opium War until the end of World
War II reflected the bottoming out of the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1912). Developments in China over the last five decades can
be interpreted as a period of recovery, a stage in the larger
process of restoring China's lost grandeur. Pulled by its
indomitable pride in people, territory, art, philosophy and
125 Thomas W. Robinson, "The Taiwan Question as Between the United
States and China," American Asian Research Enterprises (May 1996), 3.
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language, China is standing up as a phoenix springing from
the ashes.
This pride has been described as the spirit of Chinese
nationalism, though many sinologists admit China's sense of
glory actually runs much deeper than Western concepts of
national self-consequence. 126 The starting point for modern
Chinese nationalism is the humiliation suffered at the hands
of foreigners intent on exploiting and dismembering China for
economic and political profit. The nineteenth century saw
Western powers seize concession areas in Hong Kong,
Guangzhou, Qingdao and Dalian; Russia bit off sections of
Manchuria; Japan captured Taiwan, Korea and the Ryukyus; and
France colonized Indochina. Outer Mongolia took advantage of
a deteriorating dynasty to achieve nominal independence by
1912. Manchuria became a proxy state of Japan in 1932.
Although some territories were recovered after World War II,
by the time the Communists took over in 1949 the erstwhile
Qing Empire had been sliced into five separate entities: the
PRC, Republic of China on Taiwan, Mongolian People's
Republic, Macau and Hong Kong. 127
Thus dislimbed, the Chinese possess a distinct
sensitivity toward territorial integrity that finds
expression in contemporary nationalist statements about
reunifying the motherland. What is noteworthy is that the
strongest terms used by the Chinese press to declare their
seriousness in this endeavor are "inseparable sovereignty"
and "inalienable sovereignty." The Paracel and Spratly
Islands are consistently classified in these terms.
126 see Fox Butterfield's description of Chinese nationalism in
China: Alive in the Bitter Sea (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 24-25.
127 Harry Harding, "The Concept of "Greater China": Themes,
Variations and Reservations," The China Quarterly , No. 136 (December
1993).
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Since the late 1970s, China's leaders have promoted
Chinese nationalism as a unifying force to replace the
"carcass of communism." 128 In the decade after Mao's death,
the Party realized revolutionary fervor was becoming an
unsustainable source of social cohesion. Emphasizing a theme
that struck at the roots of Chinese pride, senior officials
at the center began to elevate the citizenry's "consciousness
of suffering" as a way of uniting elements of Chinese society
that were increasingly disenchanted with the Party's
socialist ideology. By attaching the regime's legitimacy to
its ability to protect and defend Chinese sovereignty,
however, Party leaders committed themselves to not yielding
on the prickly questions of autonomy in Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Tibet, Xinjiang or the Spratly Islands. Any leader who
suggests greater autonomy, much less independence, for these
areas risks being pilloried for traitorously sundering more
of the "sacred motherland." Having wrapped themselves in
patriotic garb, the regime has placed itself in the position
of brooking no compromise on the issue of territorial
integrity, even if it is in their national interest to do so.
B. PLAN BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS
Assertive nationalists are not the only elements in
Chinese society that encourage a hard-line stance on the
issue of control over the Spratlys. The PLA has seized on
instability and tension in the South China Sea to advance its
case for increased funding. An improved understanding of
China's naval build up and South China Sea strategy will
develop from exploring this key domestic bureaucratic factor.
A perennial hotbed of conflict, multiple threats
emerging from the South China Sea have been consistently
128 Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs , Vol.
72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), 72.
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spotlighted by the PLAN in its visceral efforts to acquire
larger budgets and more modern capabilities. As highlighted
previously, the Navy began to shed its hidebound coastal
defense strategy in the mid to late 1970s. The PLAN was
successful in crafting an offshore defense policy because it
linked naval expansion with the maritime threats presented by
the peripatetic U.S. Seventh Fleet and Soviet Pacific Fleet.
China began its first major ship construction program in the
1970s, according to Zhou Enlai, "to build a powerful navy and
maritime transport system to meet the threat of the two
maritime superpowers." 129 The Sino-American rapprochement in
the late 1970s and Sino-Soviet warming in the mid-1980s were
major shocks to the PLAN'S offshore strategy, because it
deprived them of overt threats with which to justify a large
ocean-going maritime force. 130
Recovery of so-called "lost territories," which had been
considered a secondary priority of the PLAN up until the late
1970s, surfaced as a major budget-justifying mission in the
new international climate. 131 Other primary missions of the
PLAN, which included strategic deterrence (submarine-launched
ballistic missiles) and liberation of Taiwan, simply did not
warrant the development of expensive high seas naval
capabilities. The remoteness of the Spratlys soon became the
^29 Extracted from Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 145.
130 see David Muller, China's Emergence as a Maritime Power (Boulder:
Westview, 1983), 167-174; Jun Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The
Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea," The Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 1994), 180-208.
131 Available evidence does not indicate the Paracels incident in
1974 was related to budgetary considerations. Other domestic pressures
were at work in this case, however, including the desire of the PLA to
deflect criticism from the Gang of Four over the PLA's loyalty. Victory
in the Paracels demonstrated the PLA's resolve and ability to defend the
motherland.
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single most important justification for the PLAN'S
construction of a blue water navy. Operations that occurred
at long range from the mainland in an area fraught with
navigational hazards and in proximity to multiple threats in
two dimensions required the development of a "modern,
technically proficient, combat-ready, long distance navy
skilled in joint operations." 132
The PLAN'S success in acquiring the requisite share of
the budgetary pie to perform the above missions should be
credited to senior naval officers like Liu Huaqing, who was
remarkably adroit in fusing the navy's narrow organizational
interests with broad economic goals and core national issues.
As the PLAN commander, Liu became an ardent spokesman for
expansion into the Spratlys. In 1984 he listed one of the
Navy's main goals as asserting China's sovereignty over its
rich maritime resources, including offshore petroleum
deposits, manganese nodules and fish. 133 During budgetary
debates in the National People's Congress in 1992, the PLAN
deputy commander echoed these resource-based arguments in
demanding increased defense spending. He highlighted China's
long term necessity to make better use of maritime riches,
particularly petroleum. 134
The notion that China's future economic growth will
depend on its ability to exploit living and non-living marine
resources, and that the PLAN must be adequately equipped to
secure these zones, has taken root in the most powerful
!32 Garver, 1023.
T33 xinhua, Beijing, August 12, 1984, FBIS, August 13, 1984, 1-2.
134 The deputy commander stated that China's offshore oil production
output was only 62 percent of Vietnam's, and warned that China could not
continue to lag behind other nations in exploiting marine resource
without it negatively impacting China's economic growth levels into the
next century.
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factions in the Party and central government. The Navy's
success in convincing the regime of the fleet's importance as
a watchdog of China's southern gate is best reflected in the
Chinese media:
There has appeared the situation of islands and
islets being occupied, sea areas being carved up,
resources being looted, and marine rights and
interests being wantonly encroached upon. In light
of this serious situation, we must give prominent
attention to strengthening naval construction,
while energetically developing the marine areas.
It can be said that emphasis on developing the navy
is where the fundamental and long-term interests of
the state and the people lie.135
Absent a Russian, American, Japanese or Indian threat,
the PLAN will continue to entertain the South China Sea as a
prime area from which threats to China's sovereignty will
emerge. PLAN leaders hope that claiming to protect Chinese
territorial interests from foreign encroachments (i.e.,
defending the water column and seabed minerals which may be
invaluable to China's energy supply in the future) will have
wide patriotic appeal.
That the PLA Navy has a deep commitment in the region is
best symbolized by the reported posting of four commodores to
the Spratly Maritime Surveillance Command on Fiery Cross
Reef. The extremely high level of authority that may be
established at this station, which is manned by only a few
hundred troops, reflects the long lasting political and
military importance of the command to the PLA. 136
135 Tang Fuquan, "Reunderstanding our Country's Naval Strategy,"
Jiefangjun bao, Beijing, September 15, 1989, JPRS-CAR-89-109, 55-57.
136 The Command was established in 1989 and is subordinate to the
Navy's South Sea Fleet. See You Ji "Facing the New Century," Paper
prepared for the conference "Sea Power in the Next Century," Sydney
(November 22-23, 1995), 19.
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Given the centrality of the Spratlys issue to the PLAN'S
blue water navy ambitions, one could propound that the PLAN
has a stake in perpetuating a certain amount of friction
between rival claimants in the lower basin of the South China
Sea. While most, if not all, Chinese naval strategists
probably advocate peace (largely because the stability it
provides enables the PLA to further modernize ) , they do have
an interest in fostering a siege mentality because it
translates into expanded budgets and a privileged political
role. 137 In this sense, the PLAN generally aligns with Party
conservatives who have been reluctant to support cooperative
measures designed to resolve territorial disputes with ASEAN.
The PLAN'S self-portrayal as an advocate of Chinese
territorial sovereignty, national security and economic
resources has allowed the Navy to cast a wide net over policy
and weaponry. The PLAN also boasts a bureaucratic ace in the
hole. In October 1992, Admiral Liu Huaqing was brought out
of retirement and elevated to the Politburo, becoming one of
the top seven men in China. 138 In his position as the only
uniformed PLA representative in the party's leading organ, he
holds sway over any major decision regarding China's defense.
An octogenarian, Liu may not long survive on the Politburo,
but his legacy of an offshore defense strategy requiring a
strong blue water navy entrusted with the protection of the
South China Sea will undoubtedly endure.
137 Nayan Chanda and Kari Huus, "The New Nationalism," Far East
Economic Review (November 9, 1995), 21.
1 38 Deng Xiaoping reportedly put Liu Huaqing on the Politburo to keep
the PLA out of reach of over-ambitious politicians and to safeguard
Jiang Zemin as Deng's heir apparent. David Hsieh, "China's Rising
Military Star," Asiaweek (May 1996), 27. Liu was probably selected
because he is a moderate leader who enjoys strong PLA support and is
untainted with Tiananmen blood.
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C. PLA HEIGHT IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
The PLAN'S influence over budgetary and strategic policy
at the center is partly attributable to its success in
intertwining its parochial interests with deep-seated
cultural mores and China's national objectives, but it is
also propelled along by the PLA's overall suasion in
political circles.
The nature of factionalized party-army rule in China has
placed the PLA in the position of being arbiter of power
among contending groups atop the Chinese communist system.
Indeed, a party leader's ultimate power relies to a great
degree on the breadth and robustness of his personal links
with the military. The PLA is not a monolithic institution,
of course, and cleavages exist within the PLA as individuals
attempt to promote their careers and seek professional
security. PLA potency is also somewhat palliated by senior
military leaders' dependency on party patronage for political
leverage, but by and large the PLA exerts a high degree of
political authority in Beijing. 139
If Chinese history is any guide, PLA influence in
domestic politics increases as leadership weakens in Beijing.
In the midst of a transition in leadership from Deng Xiaoping
to Jiang Zemin the PLA has, indeed, been given greater
freedoms in the policy arena. The weak revolutionary and
military credentials of Jiang, who is currently recognized as
the first among equals in the Beijing power calculus despite
his arguably unsteady hold on the reins, has strengthened the
PLA's hand in domestic and foreign policy matters. Jiang's
endorsement of the hard line taken by China's generals
against Taiwan preceding Lee Teng-hui's election to the
139 Michael D. Swaine, The Military and Political Succession in
China (Santa Monica: Rand, 1992), 5.
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Presidency was one of the most pronounced examples of Jiang's
courtship of the army. As telling may be his apparent
laissez faire attitude toward PLA economic enterprises, even
ones that routinely bypass state regulations or are illegal.
That Jiang regularly meets army officers and is frequently
photographed reviewing troops continues to signal PLA
predominance in affairs of state.
Perhaps a pertinent question to ask is whether this
unbalanced relationship can endure. Will the PLA continue to
drive policy and influence Party leaders to proceed with long
range plans regarding the South China Sea?
It seems intuitive that as Jiang or any other Chinese
successor consolidates his power, and the PLA proceeds toward
greater professionalism (and depoliticization) , the Party
will be able to resist potentially aggressive recommendations
originating in the Central Military Commission or General
Staff Directorate. I would posit that despite the trend
toward professionalization, military personages will continue
to be grafted, most voluntarily, into senior government
positions. In fact, Michael Swaine argues that "connections
{guanxi) thus far has triumphed over the unifying notion of
professionalism within the military establishment." 140 This
process allows the Party to erect bridges of loyalty with key
military leaders, and thereby keep the armed forces on a
political tether. But it also means that the PLA will
continue to exert considerable leverage in the loftiest
bodies in China. Party-army interdependency will continue to
survive as long as China retains the trappings of communism.
The PLA is only one of several major organizations that
vie for political attention in Beijing, but by virtue of its
control over instruments of lethality it wields substantially
more influence. The PLA's relative prominence among
140 swaine, 16.
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competing bureaucracies in Beijing was brought home in 1992,
when conservative military and senior party officials pushed
through the 1992 Territorial Sea Law over the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) objections. 141 While the MFA has
consistently taken a conciliatory stance on disputes in the
South China Sea among rival claimants, its words have
occasionally rung hollow with ASEAN states who have not seen
concrete progress toward resolving territorial issues.
Though the MFA would like to improve relations with its
Southeast Asian neighbors, its diplomatic initiatives
probably have been subject to veto by Party and military
elites unwilling to jeopardize government legitimacy by
appearing to compromise on an issue at the gravitational
center of China's nationalist agenda.
D. REGIONAL INTERESTS AND SEPARATIST INFLUENCES
1. Provincial Economic Stakes
Loosely allied with the band of conservatives, assertive
nationalists and navy commanders in their revanchist pursuits
are officials in Hainan Province. Since it became an
independent province in 1988, the island has seen rapid
economic growth. To maintain this momentum, Hainan is giving
top priority to construction of large industrial projects
including a refinery and a gas-fired chemical fertilizer
plant, cornerstone industries that will process mineral
resources mined from onshore areas or lifted from the
141 The MFA reportedly objected to the sea law because they feared
its exclusive tone would negatively impact relations with Southeast Asia
and Japan. The MFA favored a more ambiguous statement that temporarily
avoided mention of sovereignty. Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, FBIS,
February 27, 1992, 15-16. For additional data on the subjugation of the
MFA to the PLA's interests see John W. Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai,
"Beijing's Defense Establishment," International Security, Vol. 15, No.
4 (Spring 1991), 87-109.
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seafloor under the South China Sea. 142 Hainan has a vested
interest in ensuring it receives a steady supply of minerals
with which to operate its flagship enterprises.
Officials on Hainan view the South China Sea not only in
terms of a huge resource basin from which raw materials can
feed its new plants, but see the foreign companies interested
in operating there as a valuable source of revenue. If China
owns the South China Sea, oil companies will require Chinese
sponsorship and licensing. As the geographic springboard
into the South China Sea, Hainan would become a major
beneficiary of operating fees charged to foreign companies
engaged in economic exploitation in the region. 143 Hainan
would also enjoy an influx of capital designed to make the
island a suitable logistics center for companies involved in
offshore pursuits.
The interest of Hainan's officials in Chinese expansion
and control over most of the South China Sea was evident by
the participation of Hainan's governor in an inspection tour
throughout the Spratlys in January 1992, one month prior to
the formal declaration of China's Territorial Sea Law. The
governor believed that every one percent of the exploited
proven resources in the South China Sea would yield a profit
equivalent to 60 times Hainan's total economic output in
142 The development and processing of mineral resources is being
pursued as a key industry of Hainan Province over the next five years.
Close to thirty mineral resource development projects are to be carried
out, the output value of which is predicted to be eight times existing
production. "PRC; Mineral Resources to Play Key Role in Hainan's
Industry," April 12, 1996, FBIS.
143 The largest fees charged to, say, foreign petroleum companies
probably would be funneled to national entities such as the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation, but significant funding probably
would be reinvested at the local level. For example, the Chinese are
toying with the idea of constructing a major gas pipeline to run from an
offshore gas drilling site in the Pearl River Mouth through Hainan to
Macau (see CIA map "Gas Infrastructure," 724261).
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1990. 144 He noted it was imperative for Hainan to "develop
the rich resources on the Spratly Islands and in the
surrounding waters, to change them into huge material
wealth." 145
In the final analysis, ownership over and exploitation
of the South China Sea's economic largess has wide appeal
across the spectrum of China's officialdom, from national
level strategists seeking a panacea to China's growing energy
and food demands to provincial administrators eager to keep
their industrial locomotives chugging along the track of
prosperity
.
2. Influence of Separatist Movements
So far this section has discussed domestic pressures
that inspire and motivate the Chinese to establish control
over the South China Sea. But what kind of internal threats
exist that may interfere with these plans?
A variable that deserves attention is separatism. One
might hypothesize that trouble in minority regions (e.g.,
Tibet and Xinjiang), or tension with Taiwan, 146 may
sufficiently leech or preoccupy PLA forces to dissuade the
military from adventurism in the Spratlys. In fact, the
separatist problems in the western and northwestern provinces
have been routinized in the sense that a finite number of PLA
forces (and internal security services) have been committed
to those trouble spots. Also, reinforcements to those
regions probably would not be siphoned from naval infantry
144 Garver, 1026.
145 Da gong ba0f January 23, 1992, FBIS, January 29, 1992, 42.
146 Ruling officials from both the People's Republic of China and
Republic of China acknowledge Taiwan as Chinese soil; therefore, I treat
the political trends on the island as manifestations of a distinct type
of separatism.
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and naval aviation ranks, or in any way impact the force
structure of the South Sea Fleet.
On the other hand, a high level of separatist friction
with Taiwan probably would decrease the likelihood of Chinese
advances in the South China Sea. Depending on the degree of
tension, ships from the South Sea Fleet probably would need
to stand ready to augment the East Sea Fleet, particularly in
the event Taiwan was being bolstered by the U.S. Seventh
Fleet. Even if the drama fell short of war, the
international perception that China might again be acting
with imperiousness 147 probably would convince Beijing it could




Periods of high tension are usually ephemeral
(suggesting little impact on China's goals to the south). If
a hot conflict ensued over Taiwan, however, it would have
major ramifications for China's ability to reach its goals in
the South China Sea. Southeast Asian nations probably would
accelerate weapons acquisition programs and coalesce around a
"China-as-threat" banner, stalling China's ambitions in that
region indefinitely. Indeed, in the midst of China's
military exercises off the coast of Taiwan in March 1996,
ASEAN nations warned China that an attack against Taipei
would be perceived in Southeast Asia as the opening maneuver
for a takeover of the Spratlys. ASEAN threatened that this
development probably would force it to seek close defense
cooperation or an actual military alliance amongst
147 Reference the general international disapproval of China's firing
of missiles near Taiwan to scare voters from electing Lee Teng Hui in
March 1996.
148 The way in which China reincorporates Hong Kong and Macau may
also serve as litmus tests, giving the world an idea of how China





3. Repercussions of Tiananmen
Civil unrest throughout China that is containable does
not appear to have repercussions beyond the local level.
Large-scale internal instability such as the Cultural
Revolution, however, causes shocks that force China to focus
a greater part of its energies inward. The traditional
Chinese fear of chaos typically leads to rapid and responsive
measures to extinguish the source of disorder. In 1989, the
gathering momentum of the pro-democracy movement became a
direct threat to the legitimacy, authority and stability of
the central government and it was promptly dealt with
violently.
The most intriguing aspect of Tiananmen for this study
was that it distracted Beijing from addressing (and
redressing) Vietnamese pinpricks in the South China Sea.
Although the PRC media reported in June 1989 that Vietnam
fortified three large banks with outposts in the southwest
corner of the Spratlys , and more importantly that Hanoi had
decided to incorporate the Spratlys into Khanh Hao province,
an official Chinese response was not forthcoming. 150 Chinese
naval activity even declined during this period. The PLAN
was riveted by dramatic events occurring inland. Future
conflict in the South China Sea may result from rival
claimants attempting to capitalize on high levels of domestic
turmoil in China.
The Tiananmen massacre also delivered a concussion blow
149 Robinson, 12.
150 LCDR Jon Sparks, "The Spratlys Island Dispute: Possible Outcomes
and their Effects on Australia's Interest," Asian Defence Journal (March
1995). The three occupied banks were Vanguard, Prince of Wales and
Bombay Castle.
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to civil-military relations in China. The PLA may have lost
significant prestige among the people by slaughtering its own
citizens at the behest of the Party. The PLA has always been
exhorted to "put down roots among the masses" 151 ; instead, the
army was compelled to put down a quasi-revolution with the
sword. Despite having performed the Party's "wet work"
against its wishes, the PLA became extremely unpopular with
many sectors of society. Moreover, realizing its legitimacy
was appreciably weakened in the aftermath of Tiananmen and
that its survival rested with the military, senior Party
leaders (some new and owing their jobs to those who ordered
and carried out the crackdown 152 ) forcibly repoliticized the
PLA to further ensure its loyalty. In recent years, the
Party has become more suppliant in their dealings with the
PLA because they recognized their actions since 1989 have
caused much rank and file disgruntlement. The Party has
curried favored with the PLA by allowing it greater freedoms
in the policy arena, adding to the military's political
leverage. This new dynamic in civil-military affairs means
the PLAN'S bureaucratic interests may find, and appear to
have found, greater receptivity in the Politburo. Part of
the Party's guid for the PLA's guo in 1989 may include
endorsement of PLAN aspirations in the South China Sea.
This chapter emphasized the domestic forces that
influence and determine Chinese policy toward the South China
Sea. Three crucial variables that increase the likelihood
China may resort to force to protect or advance its interests
in that region include the constant use of nationalism (which
151 china Today: The People's Navy, trans. Naval Technical
Intelligence Center (Beijing: China Social Services Press, October
1987), 155.
152 For instance, Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, who also became head
of the Central Military Commission after Deng Xiaoping 's retirement in
the fall of 1989.
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oscillates between being assertive and aggressive), PLAN
bureaucratic pressures, and PLA political leverage in
Beijing. Conservatives concerned about national self-
reliance and closet capitalists in regions that stand to
profit from economic exploitation in the South China Sea
conspire to support China's long term irredentist goal. High
levels of domestic chaos probably will distract China for
brief periods, but not substantially alter Beijing's
policies. If China employs less than peaceful measures to
recover lost territories like Taiwan (or Hong Kong), it risks
casting itself as a regional "hegemon" and complicating its
efforts to plant red and gold flags on all its claimed reefs
in the South China Sea.
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VIII. PROSPECTS
The wisest sinologists will admit that to attempt
prophesy about this gigantic and mercurial nation is
voluntary folly. Realizing that history can lie, and that
past trends may have limited portentous power, the following
section seeks to make short to medium term prognostications
about Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Having
examined the case studies from various angles, the author
thinks it possible to discuss with circumspection the future
conditions under which Beijing may entertain the use of force
to advance its interests in the region. This chapter
concludes with a discussion of U.S. policy recommendations.
A. MILITARY OUTLOOK
If we are to believe anything of Chinese military
strategy, it is that the PLA is loath to engage in operations
that involve excessive risk. The PLA prefers to face off
with an enemy only if it possesses numerical or qualitative
advantages that pit China ' s strength against an opponent '
s
weakness. The case studies showed that the PLA only
partially enjoyed these circumstances in 1974 when they
captured the Paracels. In deference to their limitations at
projecting and sustaining power at long distances from the
mainland, operations in the South China Sea since then have
been very conservative.
The Chinese have been gradually improving their power
projection capabilities since the mid-1970s, but
modernization priorities and budgetary constraints have
moderated the scale and pace of these advances . The crucial
question in today's environment is not how fast China can
acquire a modern air force and blue water navy, but whether
China's future military capabilities vis-a-vis Vietnam,
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Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines will be sufficiently
superior to allow China to push out its arc of sustainable
defense further down into the South China Sea.
1. The Dragon's Reach
China certainly is endeavoring to acquire a more
muscular force that can dominate the skies and high seas out
to the first island chain. 153 At first glance, PLA power
projection abilities look formidable. New multi-mission LUHU
DDGs are China's largest and most capable combatants equipped
with improved anti-surface warfare (ASUW) , anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities. The
new class of JIANGWEI FFs are also equipped with enhanced AAW
systems. DAYUN supply ships are to be constructed to enable
these units to operate at sea for extended periods. In the
interim, China will continue to support its fleets with two
FUQING AORs and a NANYUN AOR, which was recently assigned to
the South Sea Fleet. China bought four quiet KILO diesel
submarines from Russia in 1994 and has already taken delivery
on two. China also recently purchased 72 fourth generation
SU-27 fighters from Russia, two thirds of which are already
in country. Additional purchases from Moscow include ten IL-
76 long range aircraft, potential platforms for aerial
refuelling or airborne early warning. 154 China has also
expressed an interest in acquiring MIG-31 high-altitude
interceptors . In order to improve its rapid reaction
capability, the PLA has organized and trained special marine
units for amphibious assaults and airborne forces for speedy
153 The southern stretch of the first island chain encompasses the
entire South China Sea from Taiwan to the Straits of Malacca.
154 china has reportedly received aerial refueling technology from
Israel and possibly Iran.
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deployment from transport aircraft. 155
Despite this impressive array of combat power, China
continues to be plagued with serious vulnerabilities. Its
surface fleet, for example, still suffers from inadequate air
defenses, low-power shipboard radars, unsophisticated
targeting radars, weak command and control functionality, and
basic inexperience in extended blue water operations. The
PLA is also hampered by poor interoperability between air and
sea assets. While the FLANKERS have very long "legs,"
operations in the southern reaches of the Spratlys would be
at the fighter's maximum effective range. Even if operating
from Woody Island in the Paracels, the SU-27s would be unable
to respond quickly to a crisis flashing 500 miles to the
south. At the moment, all of the Chinese FLANKERS are
subordinated to the air force, suggesting their primary
mission will remain air defense of the homeland. Without
continuous air support, naval infantry units attempting to
forcibly take and hold an island would be exposed to
retaliatory strikes.
The March crisis in the Taiwan Straits may have been a
further setback to PLA plans to develop long-range power
projection forces. In the wake of the Taiwanese presidential
elections, a senior PLA officer in charge of foreign defense
acquisitions in Moscow was reportedly instructed by Liu
Huaqing to purchase weapons solely designed for the Taiwan
situation and not for the South China Sea. 156 Of course, much
of the military hardware used in a Taiwan straits scenario
may have utility for assaults in the Spratlys, but the
155 Keith W. Eirinberg, "The Growth and Role of the Chinese
Military," Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, October 12, 1995, 3-4.
156 Hua Di, Speech on "China's Security Dilemma," Leesburg, VA, July
12, 1996.
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reprioritization in procurement suggests China's will not be
able to achieve its goal of overwhelming superiority within
the first island chain anytime soon.
2. ASEAN 's Growing Sting
China's power projection vulnerabilities cast doubt on
its ability to establish tactical superiority in the South
China Sea, particularly in light of the growing military
potency of ASEAN. Although ASEAN has ruled out force in
resolving the Spratlys dispute, many of the rival claimants
now believe a signal must be sent to China that force will be
met with force. 157 The general build-up of forces in ASEAN is
largely viewed as uncertainty-driven rather than threat-
driven, but the type of punch Southeast Asia is trying to
pack in its air and surface forces reflects ASEAN 's awareness
of the potential conventional threat posed by its larger
neighbors. After all, the rush for high-tech fighters,
missiles and in some cases, submarines, cannot be fully
explained as a response to the existing offshore threats of
smuggling, pirating, illegal migration or illegal fishing.
The six members of ASEAN spent approximately $12 billion
for defense in 1993 and as much in 1994. These states have
concentrated efforts on improving air and sea surveillance
and defense against seaborne attack by equipping their
respective forces with modern fighters , new ships and
advanced anti-ship weaponry. For instance, Malaysia will
beef up its surface fleet by acquiring two modern frigates
157 j.n. Mak, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China
Sea: Perspectives from the Asia-Pacific," paper presented at conference
on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, November 12-14, 1995, 7.
While many Southeast Asian nations are leery of China's imperious
behavior, most defend the build-up of maritime forces as a response to
the added requirements for patrolling Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs
formally went into effect with UNCLOS in 1994). Others argue high
levels of economic growth have enabled ASEAN to afford weaponry other
nations naturally seek for their own defense.
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from Britain and two ASSAD-class corvettes from Italy, and
building as many as 27 offshore patrol vessels (OPV) over the
next 10-15 years. 158 Though Kuala Lumpur may not be able to
afford it, the navy is also seeking a fleet of six
submarines, the first of which may be funded in Malaysia's
Eighth Plan starting in 2000. 159 Malaysia currently fields a
squadron of MIG-29 FULCRUM and plans to receive in early 1997
the first delivery of F/A-18 HORNETS for maritime strike
purposes
.
Vietnam and the Philippines have also concentrated on
updating their air forces. 160 Vietnam has already received
six FLANKERS and plans on acquiring an additional half
dozen. 161 The Philippines is interested in replacing its
obsolescent F-5s with either U.S. F-16s or Israeli KFIR
2000s, representing the first of many expenditures that fall
under President Ramos' $13.2 billion defense modernization
program (approved in the wake of Mischief Reef). 162 Manila is
also looking at a 15 year plan to build 12 OPVs and six
corvettes to improve its ability to defend the Philippine EEZ
from encroachments. Even diminutive Brunei is reportedly
158 The Malaysian program is called the New Generation Patrol Vessel
and involves initial construction of six OPVs with a potential total of
27 over the next twelve years.
159 "Submarines in Southeast Asia," Naval Forces (January 1996), 22.
1 60 Liza Lacson, "Air Force Should Get Priority," The Philippine Star
(September 5, 1995), 1.
161 "Vietnam Modernizes Aircraft," Jane's Defence Weekly (August 19,
1995), 12.
162 Felix Soh, "Asia-Pacific Nations Go on Arms Spree to Replace Old
Gear," The Strait Times (September 27, 1995), 20; "Islands of Discord,"
Asiaweek (February 24, 1995), 27; David Silverberg, "Trading on Peace,"
Armed Forces Journal (February 1996), 16.
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looking at maritime patrol aircraft that can fire HARPOON.
ASEAN 's sting is clearly become deadlier. The build-up
of forces in Southeast Asia is a reminder to would-be
aggressors of the poison prawn analogy; that is, "you can
swallow us, but we will make you very sick." ASEAN is
gambling China cannot afford any Pyrrhic victories.
3. Prospective Chinese Tactics
It is extremely difficult to determine what these
regional military forces can achieve in the South China Sea
given the number of intangible variables that play into
success on the battlefield, but one study conducted by the
Center for Naval Analysis in 1995 may serve as a guide in
understanding what the PLA can accomplish over the near term
(within 15 years). The study concluded that China cannot
build a regional navy and air force of sufficient strength to
dominate the South China Sea by 2010 by relying on its own
capabilities or by reverse engineering foreign military
equipment. It further asserted that even if the Chinese
economy continues to boom and Beijing takes the unlikely step
of purchasing an air and naval fleet lock, stock and barrel
from abroad, the PLA still may not possess sufficient
firepower to establish sea control in the South China Sea, a
prerequisite for ejecting rival claimants from their existing
islands and sustaining a follow-on presence. 163
If China acquired aircraft carriers the PLA would
certainly have the means to repatriate every rock in the
South China Sea, but most analysts agree this capability is
at least a decade away. According to a General Accounting
Office report, China is currently funding research and
development and training officers in aircraft carrier
163 Christopher Yung, "Chinese Navy and Air Force Futures," Center
for Naval Analysis briefing to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, January
11, 1995.
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operations, but "it will need to overcome several large
obstacles before it can field an operational aircraft carrier
and associated supporting ships." 164 One of the principal
stumbling blocks is the lack of any carrier-capable aircraft.
China's F-10, which is being built with Israeli technology,
may be configured for carrier operations, but this
development probably will be a minimum of ten years in the
offing. The Chinese also view carriers with ambivalence: a
full-fledged program would be exorbitant (to build or
purchase, equip and defend), and if one were sunk in combat
it would encur a great loss of face. 165 For the foreseeable
future, then, China will not be an unchallenged power in any
South China Sea quarrel.
Since Beijing will not enjoy general military
superiority at least through 2010, and perhaps beyond, it is
reasonable to conclude the PLA will continue to operate with
extreme cautiousness. Renowned for their perseverance,
Chinese commanders will wait until military windows of
opportunity eventually open. In the interim, the PLA will
exploit the tensions stemming from regional counter claims to
justify increased modernization of its forces.
That is not to say the Chinese will abjure violence in
the face of perceived threats. The endpoint of the above
logic is that if pricked into action the PLA probably will
employ tactics characteristic of its advances in 1988, 1992
and 1995. To wit, future PLA operations designed to win
territory will target uninhabited reefs and utilize deception
and cover to mask China's intentions. Sensitive to imperial
164
"impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region,
Report to Congressional Committees, United States General Accounting
Office, June 1995, 20.
165 china's fears along these lines were voiced by Hua Di in his
speech on "China's Security Dilemma."
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overstretch, the PLA will engage in low-profile operations
outside their arc of sustainable defense to prevent
adversaries from bringing their strengths to bear against
China's thin defenses. 166 The only caveat to this assessment
is that if rival claimants provoke or escalate a military
confrontation in the South China Sea, China will respond with
substantial diplomatic and military firepower to avoid losing
ground and/or avoid appearing weak.
B. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
Examination of the case studies revealed that China
advanced against Vietnam and the Philippines while they were
politically isolated without superpower patronage. These
nations were victims of Chinese expansionism because they
carried little weight in international affairs. Beijing
believed Hanoi and Manila would be forced to accept China's
fait accompli in the archipelagos. They knew neither country
could retaliate with economic sanctions since bilateral trade
was negligible. Barring a direct and overt threat to
Vietnamese or Philippine personnel and equipment, China
gambled neither Hanoi nor Manila would attempt to seriously
confront Beijing on a military or diplomatic front, either.
Of course, the PLA soon learned its adversaries would find
clever ways to fight and resist China's efforts: Vietnam by
occupying additional reefs while Beijing was preoccupied with
Tiananmen, and the Philippines by beating danger drums in
public. In the end, though, Beijing managed to forge its way
south by capitalizing on the comprehensive weaknesses of its
opponents
.
The stars in the political sky may never again be so
fortuitously aligned for China. Now that Vietnam has become
166 Based on land-based aircraft ranges and naval capabilities,
China's arc of sustainable defense currently falls somewhere between the
Paracels and Spratlys archipelagos
.
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a member of ASEAN and agreed to resort to peaceful means to
resolve the Spratlys dilemma, Southeast Asia stands united in
a common effort to diplomatically deter China from using
force in the South China Sea. Beijing cannot pinch any one
claimant on a territorial issue without causing all to
flinch. Memories of Mischief Reef are still too fresh.
China must idle its irredentist engine until the regional
limelight shifts to another hot spot. Even then, mechanisms
of dialogue established by ASEAN (including the Regional
Forum (ARF) and track II workshops established in 1990)
threaten to bring any untoward Chinese actions swiftly to
international attention.
Mischief ruptured Beijing's benign relationship with
ASEAN. Since then, China's has been forced to atone for its
"ill-gotten goods" by placating Southeast Asia in ways that
it traditionally has been loath to do. For example, though
China disavows the methods of multilateralism to solve what
it considers bilateral disagreements, Beijing has been
compelled to entertain ASEAN 's soft engagement strategy and
answer to Southeast Asian fears in ARF meetings. China's
promise in July 1995 to abide by the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in resolving territorial disputes is
integral to this assuagement strategy. The declaration is
certainly a positive development, but it must be viewed as an
outgrowth of China's overarching desire to prevent the
formation of alliances against it. Until China officially
renunciates its dubious jurisdictional line that sweeps
menacingly through the South China Sea, Beijing's vague
statement should be viewed as one in a series of "thrust and
reassure" tactics it has employed for decades to salve wounds
it premeditatedly inflicted. 167 It reflects more froth than
167 some analysts refer to China's modus operandi as "salami
tactics," whereby Beijing nibbles away at territory, and is alternately
aggressive or conciliatory depending on the amount of resistance
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substance.
Mischief pulled shut, for an indefinite period,
political windows of opportunity for Beijing. Further
Chinese bellicosity in Southeast Asia probably would prompt
ASEAN to lift a collective shield by strengthening the spider
web of bilateral and trilateral associations that permeate
the organization. Though ASEAN was not intended to be a
security partnership, nor will the organization ever likely
become NATO-like, the potential exists for Southeast Asia to
coalesce around a China-as-threat banner (in the same manner
it grappled with Vietnamese hegemony in Cambodia in the
1980s). ASEAN is already steeling itself for the contingency
of further PLA advances deeper into the Spratlys . It is in
the long term interests of Beijing to avoid having ASEAN
create a defensive glacis directed northward.
If one accepts the premise that China is willing to
outwait its rivals and move only when it is militarily and
politically wise to do so, then Beijing must be content with
the status quo until ASEAN solidarity against China is
cracked by other extra-regional threats (perhaps expansion of
the Indian or Japanese Navy into the South China Sea), or if
intra-ASEAN divisions create exploitable seams or rifts in
the organization. In the near term, China's handling of the
repatriation of Hong Kong and Macau will serve to intensify
or mollify ASEAN concerns over the nature of Chinese
revanchism.
C. ECONOMIC FORECAST
By charting the motivating factors behind China's
advances into the South China Sea from 1974 onwards, this
study was able to show that economic threats have emerged as
potential triggers for China's use of force. Beijing sees




resources exploited by Southeast Asia are prizes being
stripped from China's treasure pile. China's current and
future resource pressures stemming from modernization and
population growth demand that it defend its current and
future interests or face economic misfortune, domestic chaos
and national disintegration. A senior PLA official admitted
in 1993 the reason China was so keen on its Spratlys claim
was because of oil:
At present why is this problem so grave? Why are
we fighting over this? Mainly because of the
oil....[A]t present our one year [oil] production
and production quantity has not even reached the
100 million [ton] mark and if there is at least 15
billion tons [in the South China Sea], then we
could have 150 years of production. So, we want
this . " 168
1. Swords May Cross Where Concessions Intersect
If one was to speculate about the timing and location of
Beijing's next move in the Spratlys, one could simply
pinpoint Chinese claimed areas rivals are attempting to
exploit for economic purposes. In fact, the area where the
CNOOC-sponsored Crestone block and Vietnam-sponsored Conoco
concession overlap in the southwest Spratlys probably has
developed into a flashpoint that deserves greater attention
than it currently receives
.
169 For starters , large proven
168 senior Colonel Liu Sheng'e, Lecture at Hopkins Nanjing Center,
October 1993.
169 Vietnam signed an exploration deal with Conoco in early April
1996 to conduct hydrocarbon surveys in two blocks that overlap the
Crestone concession. Vietnam asserts that the concession is legal
because it is on Vietnam's continental shelf; China defends its
jurisdiction based on a general claim to the Spratlys and "adjacent
waters." Of note, UNCLOS does not provide a basis for settling this
dispute because the issue returns to claimants ' conceptions of
sovereignty . Adam Schwarz , "Oil on Troubled Waters , " Far East Economic
Review, Vol. 159, No. 17 (April 25, 1996), 65; "Beijing Said to Warn SRV
Against Spratlys Oil Deal," FBIS, April 11, 1996.
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reserves exist nearby. 170 Also, China has pledged full
protection of Crestone's equipment and personnel with its
navy, and periodically dispatch combatants to patrol the
concession area. In the Crestone block reside at least two
Vietnamese outposts on Vanguard Bank and Prince Consort Bank,
increasing the risks of potential conflict. Low level
clashes have already been recorded: Vietnam alleged that a
Chinese seismic survey ship harassed a BP-led exploration off
Vietnam's continental shelf in May 1993. Vietnamese gunboats
escorted a Chinese research vessel out of the Crestone block
in April 1994. 171 And in July 1994, Chinese naval units
blockaded a drilling rig licensed to operate by Hanoi. 172
Because both countries are becoming increasingly reliant on
offshore petroleum to fuel their respective economies, the
likelihood either nation will use force to defend their
concessions is reasonably high. The only spark that may be
needed to ignite armed conflict in this region is the
discovery of commercially viable quantities of oil or natural
gas. As the deputy commander of the Chinese East Sea Fleet
forecasted, "In a future war, the combat areas are most
likely to be over the continental shelf and at the
170 Vietnam's southern continental shelf is its most lucrative
offshore source of oil. Two fields, Big Bear and Blue Dragon, have
practically underwritten Vietnam's economy. Both fields are located
less than 50 NM west of the Crestone block, and both lay within or
astride China's historic claim line.
171 "Asia Yearbook 1995," Far East Economic Review (January 1,
1995), 22.
172 peter Lewis Young, "The Potential for Conflict in the South China
Sea," Asian Defence Journal (November, 1995), 22.
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peripheries of the ocean economic zones." 173
As discussed earlier, China cannot afford to appear the
aggressor without ASEAN weaving itself into a united anti-
Chinese front. Based on its tactical inferiority in an area
only 200 miles from the Vietnamese coast and 650 miles from
the nearest major air and naval bases in China, the PLA will
also be wary of overreaching itself. China probably would
use every tool in its diplomatic kit to discourage Vietnam
from unilaterally exploiting rich deposits of petroleum.
Suffice it to say, over the near term the contested area
near the Crestone and Conoco blocks poses the greatest
likelihood for miscalculation and conflict.
2. Viability of Joint Development Solutions
Some analysts have concluded that if China were serious
about tapping the abundant resources of the South China Sea,
intuitively its best option would be to settle the dispute
and split the profits that would flow most profusely from
joint development in a peaceful environment. 174 This path is
obstructed by several major factors, not the least of which
is China's cultural, social, political and economic paradigm
of self-reliance.
Deeply embedded in the Chinese psyche is the notion that
a patron-client heirarchy exists in all matters and that
dependency connotes subordination. As you recall, the era of
exploitation by the west that transformed China into a
veritable vassal state of foreign powers in the last century
173 Liu Fuyuan, "Liu Huaqing—from Navy Commander-in-Chief to Deputy
Secretary General of the Central Military Commission," Guangjiaojing
(December 1987), 59.
174 in "Global 1991 Wargaming Analysis of Conflict Over the Spratly
Islands in the Late 1990s," Schrader asserts that negotiated sharing of
resources with foreign capital and technology to accelerate development
is the rational choice for China and Vietnam.
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was intensely humiliating. Evidence that these memories
still wound China's self-esteem and national identity is
present in contemporary official statements. Just a few
years ago the People's Daily reminded "For a country to shake
off foreign enslavement and become independent and self-
reliant is the premise for its development." 175 This
resoluteness resonates through China's foreign policy and its
economic decisions, where autonomy and autarky are idealized
virtues
.
Of course, in the interests of providing for the welfare
of its citizens China has been forced to make pragmatic
choices that compromise its goal of self-sufficiency. China
needs access to western technology and expertise to modernize
and has opened trade doors accordingly. Beijing has set
limits on these endeavors, however. In an attempt to
circumscribe the foreign role in its economy China has
undertaken steps to protect its "pillar industries , " one of
which is the energy sector. Beijing's anxiety has manifested
itself in its hesitancy to approve dozens of major refinery
and power-generating projects. 176 Companies most likely to be
contracted are those which have found niche markets where
China possesses virtual no overlapping or compensating
abilities, such as western petroleum companies performing
offshore drilling and production. China's overriding thirst
for oil plays into China's willingness to entertain these
foreign companies, but as compelling to China's leaders is
the fact that petroleum companies have a relatively small
footprint (they operate either in offshore or remote mainland
areas where employee movements are restricted). Great
divisions still exist within the Chinese bureaucracy over




just how far and how fast foreigners should be allowed to
economically penetrate the "motherland."
In short, Beijing's stress on Chinese self-reliance, and
perhaps even the image of it, militates against any joint
development scheme sponsored by parties interested in
politically resolving the South China Sea quandary. From
China's standpoint, "joint development" means China dictating
terms with a single partner. Beijing prefers to negotiate
with state entities and individual companies on a bilateral
basis, where its hand is stronger and leverage greater.
Beijing finds political solutions calling for an equitable
division of resources unappealing not only because it may
require Beijing to relinquish sovereign ground, but because
it forfeits some measure of Chinese economic independence.
It would be fitting at this point to mention that one of
the most powerful arguments against further Chinese expansion
in the South China Sea is that it may lead to China's global
ostracization. This line of reasoning asserts that China
risks casting itself into a kind of international purgatory
if it oversteps its bounds one too many times. Ironically,
many Chinese think that precisely because China may find
itself internationally besieged in the future that it must
become ever more self-reliant. In other words, China should
endeavor to fully and unilaterally exploit all the resources
available to it as a failsafe against the possibility of
future estrangement from the world community. 177
D. DOMESTIC TRENDS
Above all other conditions, the determinant that holds
the greatest causal value of Chinese aggressiveness in the
South China Sea is the political climate in Beijing. This
177 John Garver discussed this viewpoint in "China's Push Through the
South China Seas," 1027.
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variable is also the most difficult to soothsay, though many
China analysts have attempted to warn policymakers of the
likely scenarios that may transpire in the post-Deng years.
Assuming the role of political oddsmaker, for instance,
Richard Baum considers as many as ten scenarios in a
projected timeframe of only three to five years. He admits
in his conclusion that:
China's post-Deng political transition is likely to
be a long-term "work in progress , " a complex
kaleidoscope of forces whose forms and patterns may
change over time. We should thus be prepared for a




Though most monographs are equally equivocal, some can
be remarkably pessimistic. A study sponsored by the Under
Secretary of Defense in 1994 concluded there was a fifty
percent chance the post-Deng succession would lead to a
Soviet-style meltdown of China. 179 The most plausible net
assessments acknowledge the problem of calculating China's
trajectory, but argue in favor of basic continuity wherein




The real difficulty in predicting China's future is that
competing factions in Beijing cannot come to a consensus on
178 Richard Baum, "China After Deng: Ten Scenarios in Search of
Reality," China Quarterly, No. 145 (March 1996), 175.
179 Director, Net Assessment, "China in the Near Term," Study for
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Newport, Rhode Island, August 10,
1994).
180 see Thomas Fingar, "China in 2010: Current Futures and
Alternative Pathways," prepared for Conference on "China and World
Affairs in 2010," Stanford University (April 26-27, 1996). In this
essay, Mr. Fingar cites a Chinese source who uses the imagery of a heavy
aircraft carrier trying to change course against its momentum to explain
why one should not expect rapid political change in China.
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how to deal with China's inherently contradictory policy
goals . One goal has been to achieve national prosperity
through investment and trade with the rest of the world,
while simultaneously protecting the viability of the current
regime which may be threatened by foreign influences. The
other policy goal is the nationalist-centered pursuit of
Chinese reunification. The first objective encourages a
stable regional environment while the second undermines it. 181
Although all the signs indicate China is becoming more
dependent on its commercial ties with the international
capitalist community, leading to a level of integration from
which China could not and would not want to extricate itself,
no Chinese leader can jettison the country's irredentist
policies without striking a blow to Chinese pride and thereby
risking political death. If a Chinese leader does not
respond to a perceived threat to Chinese sovereignty or long
term economic interests in the South China Sea, he will
rapidly lose the support of the people, or "mandate of
Heaven .
"
This underlying and fixed duality in China's strategic
goals suggests that regardless of likely political
reconfigurations in the future, Chinese leaders will continue
to try to balance the requirements of economic prosperity and
territorial integrity. Even moderates atop the state or
party structure in Beijing probably would countenance the use
of force to safeguard the sanctity of China's territorial
possessions.
The right question to ask, then, is not whether future
Chinese leaders will defend Chinese claims in the Spratlys,
but what character its advances would take. Will they be
offensive or defensive? Our study of domestic variables
181 Sheldon W. Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in Northeast
Asia," paper prepared for the SEAS Northeast Asia Symposium, Tokyo (May
1996), 10-11.
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permits some room to speculate. If China's senior
decisionmaking bodies are populated with conservatives and
nationalists, for example, the likelihood China may pursue a
dedicated plan to probe or recover additional territories in
the South China Sea is high. Alternatively, a leadership
dominated by moderates and technocrats probably will
indefinitely postpone reunification goals for the sake of
improved international ties. In this political climate,
China would become selectively aggressive when rival
claimants threaten its core interests. In both cases, the
methods of PLA involvement probably will conform to patterns
highlighted in previous sections.
Conjectures that trespass too much further into China's
future are of limited value.
E. U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. American Security Interests
In making the point that the U.S. should be concerned
with potentially aggressive and destabilizing activities in
any maritime regime in the world, one cannot avoid
tautologizing. American security interests have long focused
on assuring freedom of navigation (FON) through sea lines of
communication (SLOC) in order to facilitate trade and
guarantee the right of military transit during times of
crisis. It is in America's national interest to thwart any
waterspace poachers that threaten free and innocent passage
on the high seas. As a self-styled honest broker and
guarantor of regional stability, the U.S. is also expected to
be involved at some level in discouraging the hawkish
tendencies of nations seeking solutions to international
problems through the use of force. The willingness and
ability of the U.S. to dampen the matches that threaten to
spark conflict over territorial disputes in the South China
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Sea directly affects the credibility of America's commitment
to its allies and friends in Southeast Asia. What is more,
because U.S. oil companies are actively involved in seeking
and executing exploration contracts in this region, the U.S.
must also be prepared to respond to violence against them.
America has a substantial stake in closely monitoring
developments in the South China Sea.
2. Policy Recommendations
While the U.S. should continue to support regional
initiatives designed to resolve disputes through peaceful
methods, the U.S. should be extremely wary of taking too
active a role in mediating the polemic. U.S. attempts at
arbitration may be interpreted by China as another
manifestation of America's attempt to deny China its status
as a regional power on the rise. Both American officials
participating in ARF discussions and private citizens working
at the track II level should dedicate themselves to
maintaining a low profile to reduce the impression the U.S.
is acting as puppet master or somehow manipulating ASEAN into
implementing a containment policy against Beijing. If the
U.S. appears to be dictating policy it will play into the
hands of hard-line conservatives in Beijing.
For these same reasons, the U.S. should indefinitely
shelve discussions with Vietnam over the possible use of Cam
Ranh Bay by the U.S. Navy (USN). Even though USN access to
Hong Kong may be lost or truncated after July 1997,
dramatically impacting traditional USN port visit patterns
and operational tempo, 182 the warming of the Philippines to
limited usage by Seventh Fleet units of Subic Bay suggests
the Pacific Fleet will not be desperate for ports of call in
182 u.S. Navy ships currently pull into Hong Kong an average of 90 to
120 days per year.
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the South China Sea. Premature discussions with Vietnamese
officials, who are themselves divided over the issue, would
only feed China's fears of encirclement and add to PLAN
justifications for an increased presence in that area. It
also risks casting the U.S. as a tacit defender of Vietnamese
territorial claims.
The U.S. should also maintain a high degree of
circumspection over arms sales to Southeast Asia. The
transfer of high-tech aircraft and missiles may temporarily
allow some countries like the Philippines or Malaysia to
correct a military imbalance vis-a-vis China, but
proliferation of conventional weapons platforms on, over and
under the South China Sea may be a destabilizing development.
Large numbers of ships and aircraft in close proximity to one
another will add friction to the disputes and increase the
chances for miscalculation. Furthermore, the relative
remoteness of the Spratlys suggests any nation could produce
plausible cover for "defensive" actions. As we have seen,
China is very proficient in conducting low level aggression
(i.e., reef hopping) and covering it with a veneer of
legitimacy
.
A better alternative to pouring large amounts of weapons
into Southeast Asia is selling non-lethal technologies that
may possess as much, if not more, deterrent value to China
than jets or missiles. For example, transfer of surveillance
systems such as remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) or other
intelligence gathering systems would be a cost-effective way
to monitor large swaths of the Spratlys . RPVs are ideal
platforms to fly and be controlled from any number of islands
in the Spratlys. Regular flights of RPVs could replace more
expensive manned reconnaissance missions and give interested
ASEAN nations sharper eyes and more sensitive ears to
identify Chinese advances as they occur. If Mischief Reef
showed anything, it was that China has an acute sense of
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agoraphobia. If the PLAN can be caught (i.e., photographed)
in the act of occupying additional uninhabited reefs, ASEAN
could foil China's attempts to present the region with a fait
accompli. Mobilizing the world press and focusing the
limelight on Chinese "expansionism" as it occurs has proven
to strongly influence Chinese behavior. An additional
benefit of RPVs is their utility in general surveillance and
tracking of transgressors (smugglers, drug-runners, pirates,
etc.) operating within ASEAN EEZs. What is more, the non-
military use of these systems would allow U.S. companies to
deflect accusations they are siding with ASEAN over China on
the claim issue. Finally, by giving, say, the Philippines or
Malaysia an autonomous ability to perform reconnaissance,
pressure on the U.S. to share satellite-derived data will be
somewhat relieved. 183 Intelligence systems configured to
rapidly identify untoward movement in the Spratlys would be a
force equalizer giving China greater reason for pause.
While the U.S. "takes no position on the legal merits of
the competing claims to sovereignty," 184 the U.S. could play a
more conspicuous role in energetically negating claims in the
South China Sea that impinge on freedom of navigation.
"Active neutrality" may be a suitable American strategy in
fora designed to resolve existing territorial disputes, but
the U.S. must find more ways to apply steady pressure on
China to clarify its claims. While China says that it does
not claim all the water within its yellow line, it has
consistently asserted sovereignty over a nebulous "adjacent
waters" zone. Though China probably will not be forthcoming
183 After the Mischief Reef incident, some Philippines falsely
accused the U.S. of withholding overhead-derived information of China's
occupation.
184 Extract from U.S. Department of State policy on the Spratlys and
the South China Sea, May 10, 1995.
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in specifying its claims out of fear of international and
domestic condemnation, 185 the U.S. must make it clear to China
that it will publicly challenge China's arbitrary claims to
large swaths of the South China Sea itself. By laying this
moral groundwork, the U.S. will position itself for maximum
diplomatic maneuvering room should China decide to impose
illegal exclusion zones around its reefs or drilling rigs in
the South China Sea.
Perhaps using the pretext of forestalling a Sino-
Vietnamese collision in the Crestone/Conoco concession
blocks, a situation that would have adverse consequences for
both American oil workers and freedom of navigation, the U.S.
can accelerate the process of scheduling bilateral Law of the
Sea discussions with Hanoi and Beijing. An American
initiative would not be inappropriate in this context and it
would isolate the dispute from ASEAN fora, where Chinese
representatives have been reluctant to open up. The U.S.
should use its weight to hammer out something useful from
these discussions. A maritime agreement, for example,
tailored to naval and overwater air operations would go some
distance in reducing the likelihood of miscalculation among
regional navies
.
Finally and most difficult, the U.S. needs to retool its
"comprehensive engagement" strategy with China. Until the
President establishes priorities and improves coordination
between the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce and the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, China will continue
to be frustrated by fissiparous American policies. In the
future, absent a charismatic Deng Xiaoping to maintain
cooperative relationships with outside powers, Sino-American
T85 china's real ambitions undoubtedly exceed what is allowable under
UNCLOS. And, again, no leader in Beijing possesses the political will
to circumscribe China's territorial claims without short-circuiting his
career.
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relations may be subject to subversion by hard-liners in
Beijing who perceive the U.S. as unpredictable and basically
inimical to China. The President needs to expend the
political capital to reduce the emotionalism that surrounds
U.S. policies toward China, and build public and
congressional support for a truly comprehensive strategy that
emphasizes the long term benefits of integrating China into
the international arena. Then this strategy needs to be
consistently, intelligently and diplomatically applied. 186
If the U.S. can get its house in order, it will place
American statesmen, trade officials, entreprenuers , soldiers
and sailors in a much improved position to pursue policies
that can reduce the likelihood China will resort to force in
the South China Sea. Firstly, an improved atmosphere in
Sino-American relations based on mutual trust and
understanding will undercut the ability of conservative
nationalists to push their agenda in Beijing. Secondly, the
U.S. will enjoy more opportunities to strengthen diplomatic
and military to military ties aimed at enhancing dialogue on
security issues . Improved transparency will serve the mutual
self-interest of the Chinese and U.S. services and dissipate
the clouds of ambiguity that currently cloak China's
intentions on the region. Greater openness will further
reduce the uncertainty that is driving ASEAN 's swelling arms
purchases. As long as the U.S. keeps China talking, it will
move ever closer to creating "overlapping plates of armor" 187
protecting regional security in Southeast Asia.
186 Kenneth Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy," Foreign Affairs
(December 1995).
187 phrase used by President Clinton during a July 1993 speech in
Seoul. Department of Defense, "United States Security Strategy for the





This work has identified through pattern analysis of
several case studies spanning twenty-two years the military,
political, economic and domestic conditions under which China
attempted to expand its presence in the South China Sea. We
have learned that China is engaged in a long-term Go-like
game with extremely high stakes. The origins of China's
determination to uphold territorial claims along its southern
periphery lie in recent history. Annealed by repeated
imperialist invasions, China is convinced that it must hold
its ground or risk besmirching its heritage by allowing
lesser nations to hive off sections of the "sacred
motherland." Any Chinese leader who permits further division
of the "empire" will be branded disloyal for he will have
jeopardized China's aspirations of achieving great power
status
.
This thesis examined various motivations behind China's
adventurism to the south, but ranked highest as the primary
determinant of China's physical advances in the region is
Beijing's economic imperative and perceived encroachments by
contending parties to the hidden wealth of the South China
Sea. While sovereignty and domestic political circumstances
form the backdrop of China's interest in the Spratlys,
current trends indicate China takes action when economic
threats break a threshold of tolerance. As innocuous as they
appear, the offshore joint development schemes of Vietnam,
Malaysia and the Philippines probably sparked China's
declaration of the Sea Law in 1992 and its occupation of
Mischief Reef. In an era of resource scarcity, these events,
more than any other, serve to heighten China's sense of
territorial and economic vulnerability. China was prompted
to act because it would have otherwise appeared to be
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sleeping on its rights.
By all accounts, oil has sweetened the offshore
resources pot. Based on current predictions of China's
energy requirements, China's incentive to remain unswerving
in its ambitions to control most of the South China Sea is
exceedingly great. In 1994, China consumed five barrels of
oil per capita; conservative estimates of China's growth
indicate demands will rise to ten barrels of oil per capita
within a decade. 188 While China is attempting to make better
use of its onshore fields, technology trends (for instance,
mobile rigs capable of exploring and producing oil in ever
deeper waters) suggest the seabed will only become a more
valued and accessible prize. Some analysts estimate by the
year 2000 forty percent of China's gross crude oil yield will
be produced from the sea. 189 Moreover, the Chinese think the
Spratlys area is likely to become the second Persian Gulf.
China has to play for keeps, or it must become inexorably
dependent on foreign energy suppliers , and perhaps again be
subject to foreigners' manipulations.
In truth, to the Chinese it is not just a question of
oil, or gas, or minerals, or fish, but of all these and other
now unknown resources destined to be exploited by future
generations. China's actions must be viewed along this
extended time continuum, for China's leaders surely operate
under the assumption that today's decisions have a direct
bearing on their nation's long term interests. 190 Inscribed
on the reefs in the Spratlys is the bold pledge:
188 Martin Walker, "China and the New Era of Resource Scarcity,"
World Policy Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1996), 9.
189 you Ji, 16.
190 The viewpoint that China's long term economic goals require it to
control any territories which may hold future but as yet unknown
prospects is best explained by Garver on pg. 1020.
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While we do pioneering work in the [Spratlys]
today, we will contribute to the state for
centuries. We will lose our lives to defend the
reefs and protect our national flag.191
China realizes the present and future payoffs of owning and
exploiting the rich marine resources in the south, and it has
thus thrown over a heavy anchor in preparation of riding out
any storms that threaten to wash China back ashore. Though
China could profit by compromising on the issue of
sovereignty and dividing the spoils, cultural and political
injunctions prevents China's from choosing anything other
than unilateral or strict bilateral routes to achieve its
objectives in the region.
Strong domestic pressures ensure China's grip on the
South China Sea issue will not soon loosen. Undergirded by
elements in Chinese society that have successfully interwoven
group interests with national goals, a socially disunited yet
powerful majority envisions Chinese hegemony over great
portions of the South China Sea. Within this disparate camp,
the PLA exerts ever growing leverage on decisionmakers at the
center. The PLAN views expansion in the South China Sea as
its bureaucratic polestar and has a vested interest in the
perpetuation of tensions between China and rival claimants.
The importance the PLA places on the Spratlys is best
symbolized by its billeting of senior commanders on Fiery
Cross Reef.
In addition to identifying the circumstances around
which China advanced its claims, a major objective of this
paper was to study the nature of China's "aggression" in the
South China Sea. What may be useful for strategic and
tactical planners is the discovery that PLA actions were
consistent with traditional Chinese military style.
191 "I Love You, Nansha."
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Eschewing risks outside its arc of sustainable defense, where
an enemy potentially could bring its tactical strengths to
bear against China's weaknesses, PLA activity has been
notably low-key, conservative and cautious. Facing uncertain
odds and sensitive to political repercussions that would
result from overaggressive actions in the Spratlys, the PLA
has attempted to maintain a low profile by occupying
uninhabited reefs and avoiding the ASEAN 's military centers
of gravity on their island holdings. Contrary to press
reporting, China has never "ousted" Vietnamese or Philippine
forces from the Spratlys. To mask its long term intentions
the Chinese have carefully camouflaged their actions by
employing cover and deception where feasible.
In view of the growing strength of Southeast Asia's
naval and air forces, and the relatively slow pace of China's
military modernization, for the foreseeable future the PLA's
arc of sustainable defense will remain relatively static.
China must continue to honor its longstanding fear of
imperial overstretch and avoid umbrageous initiatives that
will unnessarily provoke a Mischief Reef-type response from
ASEAN. Future Chinese probings, therefore, probably will
bear some resemblance to the PLA's comportment in 1988, 1992
and 1995. Even in the event China is forced to react to
direct military threats, say, off Vietnam's coast, it will be
in China's best interests to contain the conflict and end it
quickly. Most Chinese commanders probably realize their best
opportunities lay in the future and are willing to throttle
their ambitions until the PLA possesses overpowering
advantages. These commanders will heed Confucious' advice:
Do not be impatient . Do not see only petty gains
.
If you are impatient, you will not reach your goal.
If you see only petty gains, the great tasks will
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not be accomplished. 192
In light of China's adamant behavior in establishing
dominion over the territory and spoils of the South China
Sea, is there any hope that the world can somehow cauterize
China's irredentist effort, prevent the PLA from unsheathing
its sword, or somehow defuse the tensions flowing from the
dispute? The ultimate answer returns to the type of
leadership faction that prevails in Beijing. One can expect
that the inherent dichotomy of China's strategic goals—to
engage the global community for modernization's sake and
reunify the nation at the price of alienating the global
community—will continue to cause ambivalence among senior
decisionmakers of any stripe in Beijing. In the near term,
as China struggles to cope with the passing of charismatic
elders, the younger generation of leaders in the Politburo is
unlikely to possess the broad support and political will
necessary to deselect territorial priorities. That military
action may be countenanced in the future to advance China's
long term interests is best suggested by the fact that it has
been. Still, as this thesis showed, political leaders and
military planners outside China concerned about spillover and
the freedom of the seas can be somewhat reassured that
Beijing also has compelling interests in avoiding and
containing violence in the South China Sea, at least in the
near term.
In the long run, and despite the nation's size,
complexity and willfulness, there is much hope China
^92 Confucius, The Analects , trans. D.C. Lau (London, Penguin Books,
1979), Book XIII: 17. Deng Xiaoping's secret 24-character prescription
for dealing with contentious issues echoes these sentiments : "Observe
calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our
capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and
never claim leadership." Hong Kong Jing bao, No. 172, November 5,
1991, FBIS, November 6, 1991, 28-30.
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gradually will become a responsible world actor respecting
the security concerns of others . The manner in which China
evolves, however, greatly depends on the willingness of
outsiders to understand and accommodate China's growing sense
of importance in world affairs. How the United States
engages a China "standing up" can influence the political
temperature in Beijing. Whether a future regime in China
stuffs powder down its barrels at every turn or allows the
international community to slowly untie the Gordian knot will
depend on how China is embraced. Interacting with Beijing on
a basis of patience, empathy, dialogue, and firm but fair
diplomacy will go far in ensuring extremists are stiff-armed
from positions of authority in China. While Chinese
interests will not always allow it to harmonize with its
neighbors, a healthy relationship will ultimately facilitate
peaceful solutions to quagmiry and seemingly intractable
regional problems. In the present environment of virtual
antagonism, however, Beijing appears to be content to lay low
and pay lip service to peacemakers, because it buys time for
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